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Hotwire and Priceline, unlike other online travel sales channels such as Expedia,
Travelocity and Orbitz, offer customers opaque products with aspects of the
service provider concealed until the transaction has been completed. Selling
on these opaque channels has become popular in service selling as it allows
firms to sell their differentiated products at higher prices to regular brand loyal
customers while simultaneously selling to non loyal customers at discounted
prices.
This dissertation investigates how to optimally price on opaque channels
while selling a fixed inventory over a finite horizon. This study also examines
impacts on a firm’s demand and profits by using opaque selling in addition
to regular selling from both analytical and empirical perspectives. An online
choice experiment is designed to understand customer preferences and trade
offs while choosing among different online distribution channels.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the main concept Opaque Selling discussed in the litera-
ture, outlining the goals this study would like to achieve and finally describes
the organization of the remaining chapters.
1.1. Opaque Selling and Objectives of the Study
The pricing of services (rooms, rental cars, airline seats, etc...) online has dra-
matically changed how service firms reach customers, with online travel sales
now exceeding offline (or traditional sales channels). Adding online selling
channels provides firms an opportunity to expand the market and achieve a
finer consumer segmentation (Zettelmeyer 2000, Geysken et al. 2002). Hotwire
and Priceline, unlike other online travel sites such as Expedia, Travelocity and
Orbitz, offer customers opaque products (e.g. hotel rooms, flights and rental
cars) with aspects of the service provider concealed until the transaction has
been completed. We refer those tradional online travel sites like Expedia, Trav-
elocity and Orbitz as the regular full information channels. The channels like
Hotwire and Priceline are termed as opaque channels.
Specifically, for instance, a customer purchasing a hotel room through
Hotwire can only specify check-in/out dates, a subarea within a city and a star
rating. Customers do not know the identity or exact location of their nonre-
fundable choice property until after purchase, but the price is still posted to
be seen. In this study, we will further refer the opaque channels like Hotwire
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as the opaque posted channels. Similar to the opaque posted price model of
Hotwire, Priceline offers opaque services but without posted prices. On Price-
line, consumers post bids for the opaque service and then have to wait for the
service provider to accept to reject their offer. These type of opaque channels
are referred as the opaque bidding channel in the study.
The opaque channels naturally segment customers as regular full price pay-
ing customers desiring to stay at the hotel of their choice with full cancellation
flexibility are unique from those willing to purchase the non-refundable but
discounted opaque product at the unknown service provider. Revenue man-
agement is a revenue-maximizing practice that firms implement to segment the
market by pricing into customers with heterogenous valuations on the product.
Thus, opaque selling can be viewed as a new revenue management technique
(Jiang 2007). Opaque selling enables firms to facilitate the price discrimination
and expand the market, which lead to makingmore profits than just using regu-
lar selling. These advantages has also popularized online opaque channels and
stimulated the growing interest on opaque selling in the academic literature.
The goal of this dissertation is attempting to fully understand the following:
 Connection between opaque selling and Revenue Management,
 Opaque selling mechanism and relative academic literature,
 Optimally pricing on a typical opaque channel while selling a fixed inven-
tory over a finite horizon,
 Pricing and market segmentation while selling on both opaque and regu-
lar channels facing strategically behaving customers,
 Profit impacts from using opaque channels in addition to regular channels,
2
 Customer preferences and trade offs while choosing among different on-
line distribution channels
Overall, I feel this dissertation provides a very strong contribution to service
pricing by giving a deep insight into the role of opaque pricing for services.
Although the study is conducted in a hotel context, it definitely opens the door
for the use and adoption of opaque pricing across other industries.
1.2. Overview of Chapters
The introductory chapter one is followed by Chapter 2, which provides a de-
tailed background discussion for this study. Through reviewing the three main
related streams of research: Revenue Management (RM), customer behavior in
RM, online opaque selling; this chapter well positions the study in the literature
and highlights its uniqueness and academic contributions.
On opaque channels, a differentiated good is transformed into a commodity.
Optimal pricing becomes more important while selling through opaque chan-
nels. Chapter 3 uses a dynamic programming model to illustrate how a service
firm can optimally set opaque prices while selling a fixed stock of inventory over
a finite horizon with Poisson arrivals. The demand for the firm is modeled as a
function of time, its own price and those of its competitors captured by using a
nested logit model in combination with a logistic regression model. This study
is motivated by a unique hotel booking and shopping data from Hotwire.com.
Chapter 4 models a firm selling a product via three channels: a regular full
information channel, an opaque posted price channel and an opaque bidding
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channel while facing strategically behaving customers. This chapter illustrates
how opaque channels naturally segment consumers as well as how firms should
use and price into these channels as a function of the degree of their opacity. This
chapter also discusses the segmentation and policy changes changes induced
by capacity constraints. It is shown that simultaneously selling through regular
and opaque channels even in the presence of tight capacity constraints helps
firms to segment consumers, differentially pricing into different willingness to
pay segments and improve revenues (over the absence of opaque pricing).
Chapter 5 examines customer preferences among multiple online distribu-
tion channels by outlining the development and analysis of an online choice
experiment. The experiment is developed from the standpoint of a hotel using
Expedia.com or Marriott.com as a regular full information channel in concert
with an opaque posted price channel and/or an opaque channel with bidding.
A Multinomial Logit (MNL) model is employed to analyze the experimental
data and measure the customers trade offs between price and other attributes of
the product, as well as quantify the profit impacts from using opaque channels
in addition to regular full information channels.
Chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation, discusses the limitation of the work
and provides potential future research directions.
4
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
2.1. Revenue Management
Revenue management (or yield management), originating from solving over-
booking and cancellations problems (Rothstein 1971, 1974), has become a com-
mon practice to improve revenue in the airline industry since its U.S.A. deregu-
lation in 1978. Revenue management (RM) has been implemented most widely
in airlines, hotels and rental car industries and they share similar characteris-
tics such as high start-up costs, perishable capacity, short selling horizons, de-
mand being stochastic and price sensitive. Boyd and Bilegan (2003) elaborated
the equivalence and similarity between the mathematical models formulated
from the RM problems in the hotel and airline industries. For instance, different
levels of hotel room rates based on rooms’ physical characteristics correspond
to different classes of airline fares for first, business, and coach cabins. A net
work airline RM problem considers a route comprising several individual flight
legs, which is analogous to a hotel problem with multiple night stays. The ho-
tel and airline RM problems are quite similar, but are not completely identical.
RM at an airline is applied in a centralized manner, but most hotels are decen-
tralized with regard to RM, with individual properties usually controlling RM
systems (Anderson and Xie 2010). Kimes (1989) outlines the industry charac-
teristics amenable to the application of RM, and then gives a general overview
of RM practice in the hotel industry as well as discusses implementation issues
for hotel managers. Hotel industry is the background for the research in this
dissertation, however, the main insights and results could be generated to other
5
industries without much effort given their similarities.
Because of the success of the practice of RM in those traditional industries,
over the years, RM has spread out into other non traditional industries such as
restaurants, cruise lines, casinos, cargo, golf courses, health care, internet ser-
vices, retailers etc. (Kimes 2003, Bitran and Caldentey 2003). Revenue manage-
ment is essentially a tool implemented to maximize revenue by selling the right
products to the right customers at the right time (Kimes 1989). Talluri and van
Ryzin (2004b) provide a comprehensive overview of every aspect of revenue
management. Chiang, Chen and Xu (2007) focus on reviewing the research on
revenue management after 1999 and classify the published work using taxon-
omy. Chiang, Chen and Xu (2007) not only discuss the RM practice in a wide
range of different industries and provide a thorough discussion of primary RM
problems, but also touch on some important related issues about RM and give
some future research directions in the area. Anderson and Xie (2010) provide a
comprehensive review on the RM-related research articles published in the Cor-
nell Quarterly (an applied academic journal widely considered to be the top-tier
journal in the discipline of hospitality, travel and tourism) in the past twenty
five years. Although the review focuses on the research published on one jour-
nal, it documents the history of RM expanding from tractional industries into
non traditional service industries, with an eye to future developments in RM.
Table 2.1, based on Chiang, Chen and Xu (2007) and Anderson and Xie (2010),
summarizes the papers dealing specifically with hotel-related RM.
Revenue management problems mainly include these four areas: pricing,
inventory control, overbooking and forecasting. Here we will be focusing on re-
viewing the research articles on pricing and inventory controls and highlighting
6
Table 2.1: Hotel Revenue Management
Year Reference Year Reference
1988 Orkin 2001 Kimes and McGuire
1988 Lefeverand 2001 Kimes and Wagner
1989 Relihan 2002 Baker et al.
1989 Kimes 2002 Barth
1989 Lambert, Lambert, and Cullen 2002 Choi and Kimes
1990 Dunn and Brooks 2002 Goldman et al.
1992 Hanks, Cross, and Noland 2002 Toh and Dekay
1993 Lieberman 2003 Baker and Collier
1994 Kimes 2003 Orkin
1995 Bitran and Mondschein 2003 Rannou and Melli
1995 Weatherford 2003 Varini et al.
1996 Bitran and Gilbert 2003 Weatherford and Kimes
1997 Cross 2004 Anjos et al.
1997 Hadjinicola and Panayi 2004 Chen and Freimer
1997 Zheng and Caneen 2004 Kimes
1998 Kimes et al. 2004 Liu
1998 Orkin 2004 Mainzer
1999 Baker and Collier 2004 Okumus
1999 Quain, Sansbury and Quinn 2004 Schwartz and Cohen
2000 Choi and Cho 2004 Vinod
2000 Huyton and Thomas 2005 Choi and Mattila
2000 Jones 2005 Jain and Bowman
2000 Kimes 2005 Lai and Ng
2000 Main 2005 Koide and Ishii
2000 McMahon-Beattie and Donaghy 2006 Choi
2000 Noone and Andrews 2006 Choi and Mattila
2001 Elkins 2007 Rohlfs and Kimes
2001 Weatherford and Kimes 2009 Cross, Higbie, Cross
2001 Weatherford, Kimes, and Scott
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the work that have bearing upon the dissertation.
2.1.1 Inventory Control
After the deregulation in the early 70’s and discounted fare classes were added,
airlines were facing the problem of optimally allocate seats to different classes
of demand in order to maximize the expected revenue or profit. This process
of seeking the best mix of fare classes to maximize the airline revenue is called
seat allocation, which is referred as the inventory control in a more general term
in other industries. Ever since the early stage of RM, enormous research has
been dedicated to this main component of revenue management, especially in
the airline industry. Inventory control has progressed from relatively simple
single-resource inventory control to more complicated network inventory con-
trol (Chiang, Chen and Xu 2007).
Single-resource inventory control
In the airline industry, single-resource inventory control is referred to as single-
leg seat inventory control as indicated in Chiang, Chen and Xu (2007). Single-leg
seat inventory control problems consider maximizing the revenues on a partic-
ular leg of a passenger’s potential flight itinerary. The first useful result on the
seat allocation problem was presented by Littlewood (1972). He proposed a
well known simple seat allocation rule for flights with two nested fares, which
is continuing to sell discount seats as long as discount fare equals or exceeds the
expected marginal revenue of future sales in full fare class.
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Belobaba (1989) generalized Littlewood’s rule to a multiple fare revenue
model called Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSRa) model. EMSRa is Lit-
tlewood’s rule applied sequentially in increasing fare order and only optimal
for two fare classes. Belobaba (1987a) gives a good overview of the work done
till 1987 in seat inventory control in the airline industry. EMSRa is later refined
by Belobaba into EMSRb (Belobaba and Weatherford 1996). It is logically the
same as Littlewood’s rule but the expected marginal seat revenue from future
sales is now a weighted average fare from higher classes.
Curry (1990), wollmer (1992) and Brumelle and Mcgill (1993) independently
showed the nonoptimality of Belobaba’s EMSRa policy. For continuous demand
distribution functions, Brumelle and Mcgill (1993) provided the optimality con-
ditions in a form analogous to the EMSRa formula. Li and Oum (2002) noted
that these three models and their optimality conditions for finding the optimal
booking policies are actually equivalent.
Table 2.2 chronologically lists single-leg seat inventory control research
Mcgill and van Ryzin (1999). Chiang, Chen and Xu (2007) reviewed some rep-
resentative articles that modeled single-resource inventory control problems in
different industries other than airlines after 1999.
All EMSRa, EMSRb, and Littlewood’s rule assume that it is a single flight leg
with no batch bookings, lower fare classes book before higher fare classes, fare
classes are mutually independent, no cancellations or no-shows. These rules are
usually used in a static fashion. Lautenbacher and Stidhum (1999) divided the
previous papers on seat inventory control in airline industry into two categories:
dynamic model papers and static model papers. Dynamic and static are the
terms to present different customer arrival patterns. For instance, the papers by
9
Table 2.2: Leg Based Seat Allocation
Year Reference Year Reference
1972 Littlewood 1992 Stone and Diamond
1973 Bhatia and Parekh 1992 Sun
1976 Mayer 1992 Wollmer
1977 Ladany and Bedi 1993 Weatherford et al.
1978 Hersh and Ladany 1993 Lee and Hersh
1982 Wang 1993 Brumelle and Mcgill
1982 Buhr 1994 Weatherford
1982 Richter 1994 Shaykevich
1983 Titze and Riesshaber 1994 Young and Slyke
1985 Simpson 1995 Bodily and Weatherford
1986 Alstrup et al. 1995 Robinson
1986 Kraft et al. 1996 Belobaba and Weatherford
1986 Pratte 1997 Brumelle and Walczak
1986 Wollmer 1998 Kleywegt and Papastavrou
1985 Gerchak et al. 1998 Li and Oum
1987 Gerchak and Parlar 1998 Li
1989 McGill 1998 van Ryzin and McGill
1989 Belobaba 1998 Zhao and Zheng
1989 Pfeifer 1999 Subramanian et al.
1990 Brumelle et al. 1999 Lautenbacher and Stidham
1991 Weatherford
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Littlewood (1972), Belobaba (1989), Brumelle andMcgill (1993), Wollmer (1992),
Curry (1990) and Robinson (1995) are static model papers; the papers by Hersh
and Ladany (1978), Lanany and Bedi (1977), Lee and Hersh (1993) are dynamic
model papers.
Dynamic programming (DP) is used to solve the dynamic models that relax
some of the assumptions required for the Littlewood’s rule, EMSR and opti-
mal policies discussed above and allow some real world factors such as can-
celations, overbooking, batch bookings and interspersed arrivals. Hersh and
Ladany (1978), Lanany and Bedi (1977) were the early attempts to use dynamic
programming to solve the problem of allocating seats on a two segment flight.
Gerchak et al. (1985), one of the first examples of applying revenue manage-
ment in non traditional industries, formulated a DP to solve a RM problem in
a bagel shop. The problem was equivalent to an airline facing two fare classes
customers arriving in a stochastic process. Lee and Hersh (1993) extended Ger-
chak et al. (1985) to multiple fare situations and broke the decision horizon
into numerous stages allowing only one request per period. Subramanian et al.
(1999) extended Gerchak et al. (1985) in a way that they not only relaxed the
assumption of no batch bookings, but also allowed overbooking, cancellations
and no shows.
As it was indicated by McGill and van Ryzin (1999), DP formulations, es-
pecially stochastic ones, are well known for their unmanageable growth in size
when real-world implementations are attempted. Some approximation meth-
ods for solving DP and stochastic programming problems in RM were devel-
oped in the 90’s. The body of literature on approximate dynamic programming
is relatively small and one can find good reference books by Bertsekas and Tsit-
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siklis (1996), Birge and Louveaux (1997) and Powell (2007). Recently, dynamic
programming approaches are also used in research attempts to incorporate net-
work effects in seat allocation decisions.
Network Inventory Control
Network inventory control addresses the inventory allocation problem when
customers request a bundle of different resources. In the airline industry, this
problem is also known as the origin-destination based seat allocation problem.
In the hotel and rental car industry, network inventory control is usedwhen cus-
tomers request multi-night stays or multi-day rentals, respectively. The revenue
considered in this kind of problems is the entire revenue from all connecting
flights or all nights’ stays or all days’ rentals.
This dissertation is based on the assumption that customers only request
one night stay and one room at a time (i.e. the single-resource), so we do not
spend too much effort on reviewing this stream of work. McGill and van Ryzin
(1999) provide a thorough development and review of network inventory con-
trol problems in the airline industry.
Chiang, Chen and Xu (2007) reviewed some research that addressed net-
work inventory control problems mostly in the airline industry and one in the
hotel industry, which are all published in the 2000’s. These problems are mainly
formulated into stochastic dynamic programmingmodels and solved by the ap-
proximate methods that are discussed in the previous single-resource inventory
control section.
Table 2.3, based on McGill and van Ryzin (1999) and Chiang, Chen and Xu
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(2007), chronologically lists references for network inventory control research
over the past three decades.
Table 2.3: Origin-Destination Based Seat Allocation
Year Reference Year Reference
1982 D’Sylva 1993 Talluri
1982 Glover et al. 1994a Talluri
1983 Wang 1995 Vinod
1985 Simpson 1996 Talluri and van Ryzin
1986 Wollmer 1997 Garcia-Diaz and Kuyumcu
1987 Belobaba 1999 Ciancimino et al.
1988 Dror et al. 1999a Talluri and van Ryzin
1988 Smith and Penn 2001 Feng and Xiao
1988 Williamson 2001 Talluri
1988 Wysong 2002 de Boer et al.
1989 Simpson 2003 Bertsimas and Popescu
1989 Vinod 2004 El-Haber and El-Taha
1990 Curry 2004 Gallego, G. and Phillips, R.
1990 Vinod and Ratliff 2004 Mo¨ller et al.
1990 Vinod 2004 Po¨lt
1990 Wong 2005 Lai and Ng
1991 Phillips et al. 2007 Zhang and Adelman
1991 Vinod 2008 Liu and van Ryzin
1992 Williamson 2008 van Ryzin and Vulcano
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2.1.2 Pricing
Pricing has become one of the hardest, yet most effective decisions that man-
agers need to make to stimulate the demand and gain the most profits at a daily
basis in an manufacturing or service company. Especially for industries which
have perishable products facing uncertain demand, pricing becomes one of the
main components of revenue management and has had substantial amount of
attention from researchers over the decades. McGill and van Ryzin (1999) state
that revenue management is the practice of controlling the availability and/or
pricing of travel seats across different booking classes with the goal of maximiz-
ing expected revenues or profit in the airline industry. Bitran and Caldentey
(2003) provide a good overview of the pricing research and compare results of
different pricing models for revenue management.
The goal of pricing is how to optimally determine the price for various cus-
tomer groups and vary prices over time in order to maximize revenues. McGill
and van Ryzin (1999) also pointed out that the existence of differential pricing
for airline sears it the starting point for revenue management, and price is gen-
erally the most important determinant of passenger demand behavior. In fact,
as the two main tools of revenue management, pricing and seat inventory con-
trol are fundamentally equivalent or there exists a natural duality between them
(Gallego and van Ryzin 1997). The distinction between them is whether we treat
price or number of seats allocating to each fare class as the decision variable
in the model. More specifically, if we can adjust the price of a single product
continuously (dynamically), a booking class can be closed for sale by raising
the price sufficiently high, i.e. ’shutting down a booking class can be viewed
as changing the price structure faced by the customer’(McGill and van Ryzin
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1999). By illustrating that the multi-product dynamic pricing problem studied
in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) and the inventory control problem of Lee and
Hersh (1993) can be reduced to a common formulation and thus be treated in a
unifiedmanner, Maglaras andMeissner (2004) showed the equivalence between
these two. Research on coordinated pricing and inventory decisions is surveyed
by Chan et al.(2004) and Yano and Gilber (2003). Although these two areas are
highly correlated, there have been very little published research on jointly in-
ventory control/pricing decisions in the RM literature until recently (Botimer
1994; Li 1994; Weatherford 1994; Gallego and van Ryzin 1997; Federgruen and
Hetching 1999; Feng and Xiao 2006).
Over the past decades there has been a rapid growth in internet sales chan-
nels and new technologies, which provides the companies/service providers
the capability of adjusting their prices dynamically and easily according to the
current inventory and demand level. Stochastic dynamic pricing models are
used to maximize expected revenues while selling a fixed inventory over a finite
horizon (Kincaid and Darling 1963; Gallego and van Ryzin 1994, 1997; Bitran
andMondschein 1997; Bitran et al. 1998; Fen and Xiao 2000a,b; Zhao and Zheng
2000). Demand is modeled as a Poisson process with a tensity that is price and/
or time sensitive. Unlike most of the literature that assumes the intensity is a
decreasing, or more particularly, a regular function of the price (Gallego and van
Ryzin 1994), in Chapter 3, we let the intensity be dependent on time and cap-
ture the price effect through a discrete choice model and a logistic regression
model. Thus, our demand model is the combination of a Poisson arrival pro-
cess of customers and a particular selling process based on the firm’s and its
competitors’ posted prices which explicitly characterizes the competitive forces
in the market. As in Lee and Hersh (1993), we divide the selling horizon into
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small decision periods of equal lengths such that there is at most one arrival
request in each period. Despite of the difference in demand models, we have
obtained the same nice properties about value functions and optimal pricing
strategies. The value function is concave increasing function of the remaining
selling time and inventory level. The optimal price is nondecreasing in the level
of inventory and nondecreasing in time. It is generally very hard to find closed
form solutions to these stochastic dynamic pricing problems, and even it is not
easy to implement and control the numerical solutions in practice. Therefore,
efforts have been made on finding approaches for solving a deterministic ver-
sion of the problem to get an approximate optimal solution. Similar idea is used
in this chapter where we solve a ”less dynamic ” version of the problem, which
is varying prices daily instead of varying prices at each arrival. We compare the
optimal prices and maximum expected revenues under these two frameworks
and numerically show that dynamic pricing performs better in spite of its diffi-
culty of implementation in reality.
Table 2.4 contains a chronological list of relevant articles in the revenue man-
agement context.
2.2. Customer Behavior in Revenue Management
The majority of the work in revenue management literature assumes customer
demand is exogenous given and completely independent of time, the availabil-
ity of other products and some other factors. In the early stage, some approx-
imate analyses of customer choice behavior were conducted to correct this un-
realistic assumption for inventory control problems. They usually incorporate
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Table 2.4: Pricing
Year Reference Year Reference
1971 Kostrysky 2000a,b Feng and Xiao
1981 Dolan and Jeuland 2000 Zhao and Zheng
1984 Reibstein and Gatignon 2001 Curry
1988 Lau and Lau 2001 Weatherford
1990 Oram 2003 Anderson and Wilson
1991 Weatherford 2003 Bitran and Caldentey
1992 Weatherford and Bodily 2003 Coteetal
1993 Oum et al. 2003 Elmaghraby and Keskinocak
1994 Borenstein and Rose 2003 Frank
1994 Botimer 2003 Bitran and Caldentey
1994 Carpenter and Hanssens 2004 Anjos et al.
1994 Gallego and van Ryzin 2004 Fleischmann et al.
1994 Inzerilli and Jaradiaz 2004 Xu and Hopp
1994 Li 2005 Aviv and Pazgal
1995 Kretsch 2005 Burger and Fuchs
1995 Oum 2005 Levin et al.
1995 Feng and Gallego 2005 McAfee et al.
1996 Dana 2005 Zhang and Cooper
1997 Bitran and Mondschein 2005 Zhou et al.
1997 Gallego and van Ryzin 2006 Maglaras and Costantinos
1998 Dana 2006 Maglaras and Meissner
1999 You 2007 Su
1999 Baker and Collier 2008 Levina et al.
1999 Desiraju and Shugan 2008 Liu and van Ryzin
1999 Federgruen and Heching 2008 Zhang and Cooper
2000 Feng and Gallego 2009 Levin et al.
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the effects of ”buy-up” (buying a higher fare when a low fare is closed) and
”buy-down” (willing to pay a high fare instead buys an available low fare) into
their demand models (Belobaba 1987a,b; Belobaba and Weatherford 1996). As
one of the earliest attempts on considering customer behavior, Anderson and
Wilson (2003) solved an optimal seat allocation problem where customers an-
ticipate closed low fare classes having some probability of reopen again in the
future. Their optimal protection limit set for each fare class is based on Belob-
aba’s (1989) EMSR rule. They find that using standard pricing approaches can
cause substantial losses in revenues while facing customer who strategically
wait with the hope of lower prices later in time.
The growing use of the internet not only offers the firms an easy, inexpen-
sive, and more effective way to change price dynamically, but also allows cus-
tomers to behave more strategically when making purchase decisions. More
specifically, the internet provides an opportunity for customers to gather infor-
mation such as capacity availability and firms’ pricing policies, as well as do
comparison-shopping among different online travel sites or service providers.
By using the information they have collected, customers may behave strate-
gically by delaying their purchases with hopes of getting a better deal in the
future, or pick an online travel site/service provider to make a purchase for
their best interest. In other words, more and more customers attempt to strate-
gically determine when to buy and what to buy while making their purchasing
decisions.
Therefore, the literature on strategic customer behavior in RM can be cate-
gorized into two groups. The first group of research examines the behavior of
customers who strategically time their purchase in response to firms’ dynamic
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pricing practices. These customers are conventionally termed as strategic cus-
tomers in the literature. In contrast, the customers who make a one-time pur-
chase decision upon their arrival are termed as myopic customers (Shen and Su
2007). The problem that firms are facing in most of the papers in this group of
research is commonly referred as the inter-temporal pricing problem. Unlike
the early exogenous demand models, now demand may depend on time and
prices. The second group of papers studies customer choice behavior in multi-
product revenue management settings. In particular, recently, there has been
a growing interest in modeling consumer choice behavior in revenue manage-
ment research by using discrete choice models. Demand in these models are
now dependent on the characteristics of other available products such as price,
star level, location, amenities and so on if it is in a hotel industry setting.
For a more thorough and complete review of customer behavior modeling
in RM, please refer to Shen and Su (2007).
2.2.1 Inter-temporal Pricing facing Strategic Customers
Inter-temporal price discrimination has its origin in the economics literature
on durable goods monopoly (Stokey 1979, 1981). Besanko and Winston (1990)
study a game between a monopolistic seller and strategic customers and show
the subgame-perfect equilibrium policy for the firm is decreasing prices over
time (price skimming). There is no uncertainty and no capacity constraint in their
model.
Recently, the research on dynamic pricing with strategic customers gained
some significant attention in the revenue management literature. Most of the
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work considers a monopolist who sells a finite perishable inventory over a finite
time horizon (two periods). A number of papers consider mark down pricing
mechanisms (Elmaghraby et al.2008, Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Cachon and Swin-
ney 2007, Gallego et al. 2007, Liu and van Ryzin 2007, Zhang and Cooper 2009).
Elmaghraby et al.(2008) set prices decreasing according to a pre-announced
schedule and assume strategic customers demand multi units. Aviv and Pazgal
(2008) compare a pre-announced fixed-discount strategy with a contingent pric-
ing policy and customers arrive in a Poisson process with deterministic declin-
ing valuations over time. They formulate the inter-temporal pricing problem
into a game between the seller and customers and identify a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium. Chapter 3 models a service firm pricing a fixed inventory
over a discrete selling horizon. Although the demand is characterized by choice
models, another dimension of strategic customer behavior that we will discuss
in the next section, we have demonstrated that the optimal price is also decreas-
ing over time.
On the contrary, some papers address that optimal prices should increase
over time (Gallien 2006, Arnold and Lippman 2001, Das Varma and Vettas 2001).
Several papers allow both markups and markdowns. Su (2007) models cus-
tomers being heterogeneous in two dimensions: product valuation and degree
of patience (waiting costs). The demand is modeled as a continuous and de-
terministic flow with a constant rate. Levin et al. (2005) modeled a stochastic
dynamic game between a firm and customers who attempt to maximize the
expected utility by timing their purchases strategically. By using numerical ex-
ample they show that ignoring strategic customer behavior may lead to lower
total revenues. Ovchinnikov and Milner (2010) consider a multi-period setting
where the model allows for both stochastic consumer demand and stochastic
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waiting.
Some other relevant work can also be found in advance selling literature in
Marketing field (Xie and Shugan 2001; Tang et al. 2004).
Table 2.5 summarizes the relevant research in this section.
Table 2.5: Inter-temporal Pricing facing Strategic Customers
Year Reference Year Reference
1979 Stokey 2006 Asvanunt and Kachani
1981 Stokey 2006 Levin et al.
1990 Besanko and Winston 2007 Ahn et al.
2001 Arnold and Lippman 2007 Cachon and Swinney
2001 Das Varma and Vettas 2007 Gallego et al.
2001 Xie and Shugan 2007 Liu and van Ryzin
2003 Anderson and Wilson 2007 Su
2004 Tang et al. 2008 Aviv and Pazgal
2004 Xu and Hopp 2008 Elmaghraby et al.
2005 Levin et al. 2009 Levin et al.
2005 Zhou et al. 2009 Zhang and Cooper
2006 Gallien 2010 Ovchinnikov and Milner
2.2.2 Customer Behavior with Multi-product Choices
As mentioned previously that the traditional models of revenue management
assume demand for each product is simply not influenced by the availability
of other products. Recently, there has been a growing interest in using discrete
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choice models of customer purchase behavior as an alternative to the indepen-
dent demand models in revenue management research. Discrete choice models
have been applied most commonly in marketing literature where they are used
to study consumer choice behavior and understand consumer’s brand prefer-
ences, market structure as well as product attributes. Coretjens and Gautschi
(1983) provide a general survey of discrete choice models in marketing and a
systematic introduction to discrete choice modeling theory. During the past
40 years, the multinomial logit (MNL) model has been the most popular dis-
crete choice model used by marketing researchers. MNL models require alter-
natives to have the same relative probability of being selective independent of
the choice set, i.e. the so called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
property. Nested logit model is one of the approaches employed to relax the
IIA assumption (McFadden 1981; Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985), which has also
been commonly implemented by marketing researchers.
Over the past decade, choice based models have been introduced in the rev-
enue management literature where both price and inventory decisions need to
be made. Andersson (1998) using data from Scandinavian Airlines System uses
aMNLmodel to estimate passenger preferences among buying up, being recap-
tured and deviating to another airline. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) study con-
sumer choice behavior among multiple fare classes on a single-leg flight using
a MNL model. They formulate the optimal seat allocation policy as a dynamic
program (DP). This formulation is extended by Liu and van Ryzin (2008) to a
network case, in which their DP problem is approximated by a deterministic
linear programming problem. Similarly, Gallego et al. (2004) also use a deter-
ministic approximation to solve a network RM problem where newly defined
flexible products are chosen endogenously by customers. Zhang and Adelman
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(2007) also consider a network revenue management problem where consumer
choice behavior is explicitly modeled by a MNL model. They claim that they
provide a better approximation to the resulting DPmodel of Liu and van Ryzin.
The study in Chapter 3 is similar to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Liu and
van Ryzin (2008), Zhang and Adelman (2007) in that we all use a discrete choice
model to characterize consumer choice behavior and formulate the revenue
management problem as a dynamic programming problem. However, we solve
the resulting stochastic DP problem versus simply obtaining a deterministic ap-
proximation or assuming a priori optimal policy. This difference is due to the
fact that we use price as the decision variable in the DP instead of deciding
which subsets of fare classes should offer to customers. Given the equivalence
between pricing and inventory allocation problems discussed before, it is easy
to see the relevance between the previous papers and this work. To our knowl-
edge, this work is the first attempt in the literature to characterize customer
choice behavior by using a NL model versus a MNL model.
Zhang and Cooper (2005) study a seat allocation problem when customers
dynamically choose among multiple parallel flights. In stead of considering
seat allocating decisions, Zhang and Cooper (2007) consider pricing decisions
when customers face the same choice situation as in Zhang and Cooper (2005).
Similar to our model setting, they also assume that there is at most one arrival
in each period and the arrivals follow a non-homogeneous Poisson process.
Although they do not model customer choice behavior by employing discrete
choice framework, the same as ours that they consider customers choose prod-
ucts from different inventory resources. Whereas, other papers reviewed above
examine customer choice among different products drawing from a common
23
pool of resource (Shen and Su 2007).
Similar to Andersson (1998) and Algers and M. Besser (2001), Vulcano et al.
(2008) perform an empirical choice model study of estimation and optimization
on actual airline data from a major U.S. airline. Ratliff and Rao (2007) is another
one of the few empirical studies on how choice behavior impacts revenue man-
agement decisions. Both the simulated and real data in all the work above are
using sales transactions from one service provider. In contrast, our data con-
tains complete market level booking and shopping records, which allows us to
use the traditional maximum likelihood method (MLE) estimation. As far as
we know that this work is also the first choice-based revenue management re-
search applied to the hotel setting, whereas almost all the prior literature were
focused on airline revenue management systems. There are also several papers
that study customer choice behavior in health care revenue management prob-
lems (Gupta and Wand 2005, Green et al. 2006).
Summary of the related research in this section is given in Table 2.6.
2.3. Online Opaque Selling
Opaque selling is implemented to naturally segment customers as regular full
price paying customers desiring to stay at the hotel of their choice with full can-
cellation flexibility and discounted price paying customers are willing to pur-
chase the non-refundable opaque product at the unknown service provider. One
can view opaque selling as a new revenuemanagement technique since revenue
management is essentially a revenue-maximizing practice that firms use to seg-
ment the market by pricing into customers with heterogenous valuations on the
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Table 2.6: Customer Behavior with Multi-product Choices
Year Reference
1998 Andersson
2001 Algers and Besser
2004 Gallego et al.
2004b Talluri and van Ryzin
2005 Gupta and Wand
2005 Zhang and Cooper
2006 Green et al.
2007 Ratliff and Rao
2007 Zhang and Adelman
2007 Zhang and Cooper
2008 Liu and van Ryzin
2008 Vulcano et al.
product.
Opaque selling has recently started to receive interest in the academic lit-
erature, most of the early research has focused on models similar to Priceline’s
NYOP bidding mechanismwhere customers post bids for opaque services. Sev-
eral papers consider a monopolist firm uses a Priceline or Priceline-like NYOP
mechanism. Their research issues include setting optimal minimum acceptable
price and/or biding rules, finding implications of customer expectations and
behavior etc. (Anderson 2009; Fay 2004; Hann and Terwiesch 2003; Terwiesch,
Savin and Hann 2005; Ding et al. 2005; Fay 2008a; Wilson and Zhang 2008; Fay
and Laran 2009).
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2.3.1 Selling on Posted Opaque Channels
Research on posted price opaque mechanisms has been focused on providing
a rationale for opaque selling and examining the impact of opaque selling on
the market while comparing selling through the regular full information chan-
nel (Fay 2008b; Jiang 2007; Shapiro and Shi 2008; Jerath et al. 2007). As far
as I know that there is no published research in opaque selling literature that
is very close to the study in Chapter 3. In this chapter, a nested logit model
is used in combination with logistic regression and dynamic programming to
illustrate how a service firm can optimally set prices on Hotwire-like posted
opaque channel. The work is motivated by a unique set of booking and shop-
ping hotel data in Washington DC and is obtained from Hotwire.com. It is also
the first research effort that attempts to capture how a service firm is able to
make a sale on Hotwire under a competitive market and characterize the price
competition by using a choice model and logistic regression model.
2.3.2 Simultaneously Selling on both Opaque and Regular
Channels
Most relevant stream of literature to Chapter 4 is on using opaque channels in
a multi-channel selling environment. Fay (2008b) uses a traditional Hotelling
model to study a game between two service providers selling products to two
types of customers (brand-loyals and searchers) on both an opaque posted price
channel and a traditional distribution channel. Fay shows that opaque selling
benefits themonopoly service provider when customers have heterogenous val-
ues for products, which is consistent with our main insight. In stead of exoge-
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nously giving two customers segments, brand-loyals and searchers in Fay 2008b,
our model allows all customers to segment themselves by maximizing their sur-
pluses on each channel.
Similar to Fay (2008b), Jiang (2007) also develops a Hotelling type model to
illustrate how a firm should price on regular full information channels versus
opaque channels. Similar to us, Jiang considers a monopoly firm and so ne-
glects competition in both the regular and opaque markets. This simplification
enables the study to be focused on investigating when to implement opaque
selling. Shapiro and Shi (2008) extend the model of Fay (2008b) to N firms with
the number of firms indicating the degree of opacity - uncertainty in knowledge
of service provider increases with number of firms. We are the first study that
explicitly models this degree of opacity and uses it to demonstrate how cus-
tomers value opaque products compared to full-information products. Jerath
et al. (2010) compare opaque selling with last-minute direct selling and obtain
the conditions under which opaque selling is preferred. A two period duopoly
game is examined, and so consumers are assumed to strategically time their
purchases along with choosing the best channel to buy. Unlike most of the re-
lated research including ours, Jerath et al. (2010) considers the situation where
demand is uncertain and constrained by capacity.
So far, the papers we have reviewed have focused on comparing selling on
posted opaque channels like Hotwire and on regular full information channels
like Expedia. There are a few papers in the literature that consider selling on
different channels including the Priceline like NYOP channel. Wang et al.(2009)
develop a two period game theoretic model of a supplier using both regular
posted price full information channels as well as a NYOP channel to reach het-
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erogeneous customers. They first partition customers into two groups, business
and leisure travellers, and their leisure travellers will then be divided into seg-
ments according to their willingness to pay for the service, which is assumed to
be uniformly distributed over [0; 1] as in our model. However, different from
us, it is assumed that the customers can not return to the regular posted-price
channel to purchase the service if their bid on NYOP channel fails.
Fay (2009) examines a game between two firms, and each one can sell ei-
ther through the NYOP mechanism or the posted price channel like Hotwire.
In his model, customers have different frictional costs on biding on a NYOP re-
tailer but have the same reservation value for products, whereas we segment
customers based on their heterogenous products valuations. Cai et al. (2009)
investigates the potential benefits to a NYOP retailer by adding a retailer-own
list-price channel. They compare two biding scenarios, single-bid and double-
bid, in both single-channel and dual-channel situations. Their model setup is
close to ours in a way that customers are allowed to come back to the list-price
channel if their bid is rejected (also in Ding et al. 2005). However, instead of en-
dogenously partitioning themselves into segments by choosing their preferred
channels to buy as modeled in our study, their customers are segmented into
two groups where one group buys from list-price channel only and the other
one is willing to bid.
Priceline’s NYOP mechanism is commonly viewed as a reverse auction
(Ding et al. 2005; Fay and Laran 2009; Fay 2009). While there is an exten-
sive body of research on the use of auctions, very little of this research looks
at the simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices. Firms can use auctions
to reach customers whommay not otherwise purchase, as posted prices may be
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too high. Conversely auctions potentially dilute revenues as customers willing
to pay posted (full prices) may purchase (at lower prices) via the auction. The
opaque nature of Priceline’s NYOP model helps to avoid this dilution. Etizon,
Pinker and Seidmann (2006) is one of the few auction related papers that looks
at the simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices. Similar to our develop-
ment they look at a firm with excess supply facing consumers who strategically
choose to purchase at posted prices or bid (resorting to posted prices if their
bid fails). Caldentey and Vulcano (2004) study a RM problem where the seller
manages simultaneously both the multiunit auction and the list price channels
with customers arriving in a Poisson process. They also assume customers en-
dogenously segment themselves by maximizing their own surpluses. Different
from our model, consumers do not face any product opacity with the auction
but do incur a waiting cost associated with bidding. Van Ryzin and Vulcano
(2004) look at firm using posted prices as well as an auction mechanism, unlike
our model of endogenous channel choice (strategic customers similar to Etizon
et al.) they assume separate streams of customers to each channel with the seller
deciding on inventory allocation across the channels.
There are some other closely related research which consider various forms
of product differentiation and price discrimination. Fay and Xie (2008) define a
new form of product termed as probabilistic goods under which customers have a
probability of getting any one of several distinct goods. Customers do not know
the identity of the good until after the purchase, which is analogous to opaque
selling. By introducing probabilistic goods, firms are able to reduce the mismatch
between capacity and demand under the circumstance of uncertain customer
preferences structure. Another similar concept flexible product was introduced
by Gallego and Phillips (2004) and Gallego et al. (2004). By selling a flexible
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product, firms have the flexibility of assigning one out of a set of alternative
products to the customer if there are excess inventories for that product. Like
probabilistic goods, flexibility products are also offered at a discount, which
provides a new dimension for firms to segment a market as well as improve ca-
pacity utilization. An opaque product is also somewhat comparable toDamaged
goods in Deneckere and McAfee (1996) because products available on opaque
channels are lack of some critical information before the transaction is finished
and also may not be refunded for free. Deneckere and McAfee (1996) show that
firms could have a Pareto improvement in profits through selling intentionally
damaged goods along with the rest high-quality goods to heterogenous con-
sumers. They model a monopolist firm segments the market in two cases by
offering damaged goods. The first case is there are two distinct types of cus-
tomers who buy either high or low quality goods only, whereas in the second
case consumers are having continuous value on goods. Our model setting fits in
their second case and so market is segmented endogenously. Versioning litera-
ture (Varian 2000) and multi-channel competition literature (Chiang et al. 2003;
Coughlan and Soberman 2005; Zettelmeyer 2000) is also relevant.
In Chapter 4, we develop a stylized model of consumers looking to acquire
travel services through either full information or opaque channels (both posted
price and bidding). Consumers choose their channel or sequence of channels (in
the case of bidding first followed by posted prices) that maximizes their surplus.
This study is unique from the previous reviewed literature in that it is the only
paper that investigates a firm using two opaque (posted and bidding) channels
simultaneously with regular full information posted price channels. Second,
most of the prior research assumes two or more exogenous customer segments
(i.e. business and leisure) with the opaque channels targeted at the leisure or
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price sensitive segment; whereas we develop endogenous consumer segments
where consumers choose the channel of their choice by maximizing their sur-
plus. We also discuss the segmentation and policy changes changes induced by
capacity constraints. We show that simultaneously selling through regular and
opaque channels even in the presence of tight capacity constraints helps firms
to segment consumers, differentially pricing into different willingness to pay
segments and improve revenues (over the absence of opaque pricing).
To our knowledge, the research work in Chapter 5 is the first empirical study
to understand opaque selling along with regular selling through experimen-
tal choice analysis. From both analytical and empirical perspectives, studies in
Chapter 4 and 5 show that appropriately using opaque selling along with reg-
ular selling can improve total profits even under the situation where there is a
cannibalization effect due to some possible switchers to the opaque channels.
This rationale of using opaque selling has already been demonstrated in almost
all the papers reviewed above by implementing different models under various
situations.
Table 2.7 summarized the related research to online opaque selling as well
as their model set up information. The followings are the definitions of some of
the notations in the table:
REG - refers to regular full information online travel sites (e.g. Expedia.com).
OPQ - refers to posted opaque online travel sites (e.g. Hotwire.com).
BID - refers to opaque bidding online travel sites (e.g. Priceline’s Name Your
Own Price).
EX - refers to the situationwhere customer segments are exogenously given (e.g.
Brand-loyals and Switchers, Business and Leisures).
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EN - refers to the situation where customer segments are endogenously given
(e.g. choosing the channel or product by maximizing (or minimizing) their sur-
plus (or cost).
N/A - refers to the situation where there are no customer segments since there
is only one channel considered in the model.
32
Table 2.7: Related Research to Online Opaque Selling
Model Information
Reference Seller Channel Structure Customer Segments
Deneckere and McAfee (1996) One Analogous to REG+OPQ Both EX and EN
Zettelmeyer (2000) Multiple Analogous to REG+OPQ EX
Chiang et al. (2003) One Analogous to REG+OPQ EN
Hann and Terwiesch (2003) One Priceline N/A
Caldentey and Vulcano (2004) One Analogous to REG+BID EN
Fay (2004) One Priceline N/A
Gallego and Phillips (2004) One Analogous to REG+OPQ EN
Gallego et al. (2004) One Analogous to REG+OPQ EN
van Ryzin and Vulcano (2004) One Analogous to REG+BID EX
Coughlan and Soberman (2005) Two Analogous to REG+OPQ EX
Ding et al. (2005) One Priceline-Like N/A
Terwiesch et al. (2005) One Priceline-Like N/A
Etizon et al. (2006) One Analogous to REG+BID EN
Jiang (2007) One Analogous to REG+OPQ EX
Fay (2008a) One Priceline-Like N/A
Fay (2008b) Two Analogous to REG+OPQ EX
Fay and Xie (2008) One Analogous to REG+OPQ EN
Shapiro and Shi (2008) Multiple Analogous to REG+OPQ EX
Wilson and Zhang (2008) One Priceline N/A
Anderson (2009) One Priceline N/A
Cai et al. (2009) Two Analogous to REG+BID EX
Fay (2009) Two Analogous to OPQ+BID EX
Fay and Laran (2009) One Priceline-Like N/A
Wang et al. (2009) One Analogous to REG+BID EX
Jerath et al. (2010) Two Analogous to REG+OPQ EN
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CHAPTER 3
A CHOICE BASED DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH FOR
SETTING OPAQUE PRICES
3.1. Introduction
Using opaque products allows firms to reach price sensitive consumers by offer-
ing discounts given the uncertainty of the seller while simultaneously selling at
higher prices to brand loyal consumers on regular non-opaque channels. While
opaque selling is most commonly used in the selling of travel services and pi-
oneered by Priceline.com, as discussed in Fay (2008) it offers opportunities for
numerous retailers. The pricing of services (rooms, rental cars, airline seats,
etc...) online has dramatically changed how service firms reach customers, with
online travel sales now exceeding offline (or traditional sales channels). Initial
thoughts about pricing online were very positive as firms had new channels
to reach customers enabling increased opportunities for segmentation. Over
time service providers have increased efforts to move customers back to com-
pany direct distribution channels (company websites and call centers) in an
effort to control sales costs and commissions while maintaining direct contact
with the customer to facilitate loyalty programs and other marketing efforts.
Hotwire and Priceline, unlike other online travel sites such as Expedia, Trav-
elocity and Orbitz, offer customers opaque products (e.g. hotel rooms, flights
and rental cars) with aspects of the service provider concealed until the trans-
action has been completed. For instance a customer purchasing a hotel room
through Hotwire can only specify check-in/out dates, a subarea within a city
and a star rating. Customers do not know the identity or exact location of their
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non-refundable choice property until after purchase. Opaque travel sites of-
fer service providers a convenient channel to segment customers and distribute
discounted products without cannibalizing or diluting full priced products. The
opaque channels naturally segment customers as regular full price paying cus-
tomers desiring to stay at the hotel of their choice with full cancelation flexibility
are different from those willing to purchase the non-refundable opaque product
at the unknown service provider. Therefore service providers need to under-
stand better how to optimally set prices on opaque channels. This question is
the focus of our paper.
In this paper we develop a nested logit (NL) model of customer choice using
data from transactions occurring at Hotwire.com. The choicemodel provides in-
sight into the impact of property characteristics that customers can access before
purchases (i.e. price, star rating, neighborhood) on the market share. We also
estimate a logistic regression model using data from a Washington DC based
hotel to determine whether or not a service firm is displayed at Hotwire. These
two price dependent models are then combined with dynamic programming to
determine optimal prices for the service firm to post at Hotwire.
There is a growing interest in modeling demand using discrete choice mod-
els to improve revenue management and pricing. Unlike most choice-based
revenue management research which uses an individual firm’s sales data for
parameter estimation, our data includes market level purchase transaction in-
formation (purchases across all service providers, not a single provider) as well
as records of the requests that did not induce an actual purchase. We solve
a stochastic dynamic program to set optimal choice-based prices for a service
provider to post on the intermediary. We characterize the structure of this opti-
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mal policy and benchmark optimal fixed price policies against dynamic pricing
policies.
In Section 3.2 we briefly summarize the related literature, Section 3.3 de-
scribes our data and estimation of the NL model as well as the logistic regres-
sion, with Section 3.4 devoted to the development of the dynamic program for
setting dynamic and daily fixed prices. A numerical example in Section 3.5 is
used to illustrate how pricing policies change with capacity and length of sell-
ing horizon. Finally, we provide some conclusions and possible future work in
Section 5.5.
3.2. Literature Review
Most of the early research on opaque pricing focusses on Priceline’s Name-Your-
Own-Price mechanism or similar opaque bidding channels (e.g. Anderson 2009;
Fay 2004; Hann and Terwiesch 2003; Terwiesch, Savin and Hann 2005 andWang
et al. 2006). As we focus on the posted price opaque model of Hotwire versus
the bidding format of Priceline we refer readers to Anderson (2009) for a review
of this research stream. Here we summarize research on posted price opaque
mechanisms. Fay (2008) is the first paper to investigate how product opacity
affects the market. Fay studies two competing service providers selling prod-
ucts to two types of customers (business and leisure) on both an opaque posted
price channel and a traditional distribution channel. Fay shows that opaque sell-
ing benefits the monopoly service provider when customers have heterogenous
values for products. Similar to Fay (2008), Jiang (2007) also considers hetero-
geneous customers and studies how online opaque selling, as a new price dis-
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crimination technique, improves profits for service providers. Jiang compares
opaque selling and regular selling (selling full-information products), providing
insight when to implement opaque selling. Jiang also investigates the impact of
opaque selling on social welfare. Shapiro and Shi (2008) focus on providing a
rationale for opaque selling. They explain why service providers are willing to
distribute products through opaque travel sites such as Priceline and Hotwire
and lose the advantage of product differentiation. Jerath, Netessine and Veer-
araghavan (2007) compare opaque selling with last-minute direct selling and
obtain the conditions under which opaque selling is preferred.
Research on the application of choicemodels is quite diverse in both themar-
keting as well as the operations literature. Discrete choicemodels have been em-
ployed to study consumer choice behavior and understand consumer’s brand
preferences, market structure as well product attributes. Coretjens and Gautschi
(1983) provides a general survey of discrete choice models in marketing and a
systematic introduction to discrete choice modeling theory. During the past 40
years, the multinomial logit (MNL) model has been the most popular discrete
choice model used by marketing researchers (e.g. Guadagni and Little 1983, Kr-
ishnamurthi and Raj 1991, Go¨nu¨l and Srinivasan 1993, Fader and Hardie 1996).
MNL models require alternatives to have the same relative probability of being
selective independent of the choice set, the so called Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) property. The IIA property of the MNL model has given rise
to the development of nested models. Dalal and Klein (1988) give several ap-
proaches to relax the IIA assumption and the nested logit model is one of them.
Since the nested logit model is a natural generalization of the MNL model (Mc-
Fadden 1981, Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985) and it can be estimated easily, it has
been commonly implemented by marketing researchers.
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By adding the customer’s decision on the selection of the category, Guadagni
and Little (1998) extend the MNL formulation in Guadagni and Little (1983)
which only models the brand choice for coffee purchase using an NL model
that include both decision components (nested on categories). They demon-
strate that the NLmodel allows a more accurate calculation of sales and a better
forecasting of market response to store promotion. They use 32 weeks of cof-
fee purchase panel data collected from four Kansas City stores, which contains
information such as the date, the price, the item purchased and the household
buying for each coffee purchase. Similarly, our model is based on 6 weeks of
booking and shopping data in Washington DC from Hotwire, which includes,
for each purchase and search, the date, the property’s star rating, neighborhood
and price. Because the properties located in the same neighborhood share some
characteristics, our NLmodel is nested on the neighborhood. Guadagni and Lit-
tle (1998) use a sequential estimation technique (estimate separate levels of the
NL tree in sequential order from the bottom to the top), similar to Dubin (1986)
and Kannan and Wright (1991). However, we implement the full maximum
likelihood estimation i.e. estimating all the levels of the NL simultaneously-as
it can yield statistically consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the
parameters that sequential estimation cannot (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985).
Over the past decade, choice based models have been introduced in the rev-
enue management literature where both price and inventory decisions need to
be made. Andersson (1998) using data from Scandinavian Airlines System uses
aMNLmodel to estimate passenger preferences among buying up, being recap-
tured and deviating to another airline. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) study con-
sumer choice behavior among multiple fare classes on a single-leg flight using
a MNL model. They formulate the optimal seat allocation policy as a dynamic
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program (DP). This formulation is extended by Liu and van Ryzin (2008) to a
network case, in which their DP problem is approximated by a deterministic
linear programming problem. Similarly, Gallego et al. (2004) also use a deter-
ministic approximation to solve a network RM problem where newly defined
flexible products are chosen endogenously by customers. Zhang and Adelman
(2007) also consider a network revenue management problem where consumer
choice behavior is explicitly modeled by a MNL model. They claim that they
provide a better approximation to the resulting DPmodel of Liu and van Ryzin.
Our paper is similar to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Liu and van Ryzin
(2008), Zhang and Adelman (2007) in that we all use a discrete choice model to
characterize consumer choice behavior and formulate the revenue management
problem as a dynamic programming problem. However, we solve the resulting
stochastic DP problem versus assuming a priori optimal policy. This difference
is due to the fact that we use price as the decision variable in the DP instead of
deciding which subsets of fare classes to offer to customers. To our knowledge,
this paper is the first attempt in the literature to characterize customer choice
behavior by using a NL model versus a MNL model.
Zhang and Cooper (2005) study a seat allocation problem when customers
dynamically choose among multiple parallel flights. Similar to our model set-
ting, they also assume that there is at most one arrival in each period and the
arrivals follow a non-homogeneous Poisson process. They do not model cus-
tomer choice behavior in a discrete choice framework, similar to this paper,
they assume that customers choose products from different inventory resources.
In contrast, other papers from the literature examine customer choice between
products using a common pool of resources.
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More recently Vulcano et al. (2010) apply the simulation based optimization
approach used in van Ryzin and Vulcano (2008) to estimate optimal controls
where passenger demand is estimated use choice based models approximated
with the expectation-maximization algorithm owing to their use of censored
data. Gallego et al. (2009) use a choice based model in conjunction with EMSR
heuristic, see Belobaba (1987), to set leg level inventory controls. Similar to An-
dersson (1998) and Algers and Besser (2001), Vulcano et al. (2010) perform an
empirical choice model study of estimation and optimization on actual airline
data from a major U.S. airline. Both the simulated and real data in all the work
above are using sales transactions from one service provider. In contrast, our
data contains complete market level booking and shopping records, which al-
lows us to use the traditional maximum likelihood method (MLE) estimation.
This unique data also allows us to truly and better characterize the price com-
petition, since the competitors’ prices are included in our data (not in one com-
pany’s sales data) and so were captured in the choice probability resulting from
the choice model. As far as we know this work is also the first choice-based
revenue management research applied to the hotel setting, whereas almost all
prior literature focused on airline revenue management systems.
3.3. Demand Models for Opaque Products
In the following section we briefly describe our data set and outline the appli-
cation of a nested logit choice model to this data set.
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3.3.1 Data
Our data consists of daily data on all hotel booking requests and purchase trans-
actions made through Hotwire in Washington DC over an arrival period of 6
weeks. As the first request was made 321 days before arrival (DBA), our data
set extends beyond one year. Each data record consists of the date the request
was made (date consumer shopped online), the check-in and check-out dates,
and characteristics of the properties such as price, star rating and neighborhood
within DC. The data also contains information on whether a request led to a
purchase transaction.
There are 195,226 requests in total in the data set and 7,509 of them lead to
a reservation. Looking at 7,505 reservations (we drop 4 of the 7,509 as these
are the only 4 reservations for 4.5 star properties) we get a feel for what sort of
properties customers are booking and where they are located within DC. Table
3.1 displays the percent of reservations or market share on Hotwire by hotel star
level. Table 3.2 shows a similar market share summary by geographic subarea
(neighborhood) within Washington, DC. While requests were made as early as
321 DBA, over two thirds of reservations are made within the last 10 DBA.
From Tables 3.1 and 3.2 we see each star and area receiving some fraction
of reservations with stars 3, 3.5 and 4 dominating and Dupont Circle-Embassy
Row themost popular area. Figure 3.1 illustrates some of the price tradeoffs cus-
tomers are making when selecting hotel star levels. In Figure 3.1 the horizontal
axis is a 4 star property’s price relative to the 3.5 star property’s prices in the
same neighborhood. A relative price of 100% means the 4 and 3.5 star property
were priced the same, with 80% indicating the 4 star was 20% cheaper than the
3.5 star. The bars, the primary vertical axis, represent 4 star purchases at each
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Table 3.1: Percentage of reservations by hotel star level, Washington DC
Star rating Percentage of booking (%)
1 0.1
2 5.2
2.5 4.2
3 18.9
3.5 15
4 56.6
Table 3.2: Percentage of reservations by Washington, DC subarea
Neighborhood Percentage of booking (%)
Alexandria-Old Town 12.3
Arlington 3.5
Bethesda-Silver Spring 2.4
Chantilly-Dulles Intl Airport IAD South 4.3
Crystal City-Reagan National Airport DCA 2.3
Dupont Circle-Embassy Row 45.5
Georgetown 1.8
Kennedy Center-GW University 0.6
Reston-Sterling-Dulles Intl Airport IAD North 2.5
South of the Mall 0.8
The White House-Capitol Hill 24
price point as a percentage of all 4 star purchases. As shown in the graph, the
majority of the purchases are made at properties with relative prices of 90% or
less. The solid line (the secondary vertical axis) corresponds to the market share
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of reservations and market share star level price
ratios
of 4 star properties at each discount. We see market share decrease with relative
price increases. We note that even when the 4 star property is 30% cheaper than
a 3.5 star (relative price of 70%), there are still sales made to other star quali-
ties as market share is less than 1. Figure 3.1 indicates that while customers are
making price tradeoffs (price is a primary driver of the purchase decision) there
must be other factors motivating purchase choice - motivating our use of choice
models for estimating market share or purchase probability. An interesting ob-
servation is the existence of price inversion where hotels of higher star rating
are priced cheaper than lower rated hotels. Figure 3.1 shows that 4 star proper-
ties tend to have very high market share under price inversion, but that drastic
price inversion does not occur that often as indicated by the height of the bars.
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3.3.2 The nested logit model and estimation
A discrete choice model is designed to explain how an individual decision
maker makes a choice among a feasible set of alternatives. In this case, the deci-
sion makers are the consumers who make requests and book a hotel located in
Washington D.C. through Hotwire.com. We represent the consumer choice be-
havior using the nested logit model. Although the MNL model is widely used
in modeling choice behavior, it requires alternatives in the choice set to have
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. The IIA property
requires that changes in the choice set do not affect the ratio of choice probabil-
ities of any two alternatives. Under this property, all alternatives should have
the same measure of similarity. The IIA property is often violated when some
alternatives share attributes (are similar), but some do not (are dissimilar). The
nested logit model is an extension to the MNL model which was introduced to
relax the IIA assumption by grouping similar alternatives.
Specifically, consumer n is faced with a decision of booking a property at a
star level j within a neighborhood i in Washington D.C. The universal choice
set of alternatives denoted by C consists of all the properties identified by an
(i; j) pair (neighborhood, star). Each consumer n has a corresponding choice
set Cn  C. We partition the alternatives into 11 groups by neighborhood. In
other words, the properties in each group are in the same neighborhood. We
need to construct a nested logit model to avoid the violation of the IIA property
as comparing a 3 star to a 4 star hotel in the same neighborhood is a different
tradeoff compared to choosing between a 3 star in one neighborhood over a 3
star hotel in another neighborhood. In our two-level NL model, neighborhood
is the first-level feature i and star is the second-level feature j. The random
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utility that consumer n books a property of star quality jwithin neighborhood i
is given by
Uni j = 0xni j + "ni + "ni j (3.1)
= pxni jp + s1xn js1 + s2xn js2 + s3xn js3 + s4xn js4 + s5xn js5 + "ni + "ni j
where xni j = (xni jp; xn js1; xn js2; xn js3; xn js4; xn js5)0 is the vector of attributes of a prop-
erty at star level j in a neighborhood i. xni jp represents the price of alternative
(i; j) and xn jsi are indicator variables for 5 star qualities (1, 2, 2.5, 3, and 3.5 (stars)
with the reference a 4 star hotel.  = (p; s1; s2; s3; s4; s5)0 is the parameter vec-
tor that captures the consumer’s preferences for those attributes and it needs to
be estimated.
"ni j is the random error term corresponding to the alternative (i; j) 2 Cn,
which follows a Gumbel distribution. "ni is the random error term correspond-
ing to neighborhood i and is distributed such that max j2Jni Uni j is Gumbel dis-
tributed with scale parameter I , commonly known as the dissimilarity coeffi-
cient. Jni is defined as the set of all star qualities available for consumer n if he
or she chose neighborhood i at the first level.
The probability that consumer n chooses alternative (i; j) 2 Cn is given by:
Pn(i; j) = Pr[Ui j  Ui0 j0 for all (i0; j0) 2 Cn]
= Pn(i)  Pn( jji)
=
eV
0
i 
IP
i02In e
V0i0
I 
e
0xni jP
j02Jni e
0xni j0
(3.2)
where,
V 0i0 = ln
X
j2Jni
e
0xni j ; (3.3)
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is called the inclusive value and represents the scaled effect of the utilities in the
second-level on the first-level’s utility. In is the set of all neighborhoods in Cn.
Table 3.3: Nested logit parameter estimates
Parameter Parameter Standard P-value
Estimate Error
p -0.06941 0.0016 0.0000
s1 -7.7288 0.3784 0.0000
s2 -6.2962 0.1259 0.0000
s3 -5.0331 0.1121 0.0000
s4 -3.1586 0.0704 0.0000
s5 -1.9744 0.0592 0.0000
DBA -0.0153 0.0037 0.0000
1st-level Feature Dissimilarity Standard
Neighborhood Coefficient Error
Alexandria-Old 0.6874 0.0187 0.0000
Arlington 0.7376 0.0202 0.0000
Bethesda-Silver Spring 0.7425 0.0217 0.0000
Chantilly-Dulles Intl Airport IAD South 0.9049 0.0243 0.0000
Crystal City-Reagan National Airport DCA 0.6674 0.0183 0.0000
Dupont Circle-Embassy Row 0.4678 0.0141 0.0000
Georgetown 0.5832 0.061 0.0000
Kennedy Center-GW University 0.7361 0.0249 0.0000
Reston-Sterling-Dulles Intl Airport IAD North 0.9700 0.0264 0.0000
South of the Mall 0.6068 0.0178 0.0000
The White House-Capitol Hill 0.4463 0.0129 0.0000
We estimate the parameters p; si for i = 1; 2:::; 5 and obtain the choice prob-
abilities by applying the maximum likelihood method using NLOGIT (Greene,
2007). Table 3.3 summarizes parameter estimates. As shown in Table 3.3 all the
estimates of the parameters are significant and have the expected sign. The pa-
rameters for price are negative, implying that consumers prefer properties with
lower prices. The parameters for star rating’s indicator variables are all negative
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with s1 < s2 < ::: < s5 indicating customers prefer higher quality hotels. The
dissimilarity coefficients are all significantly different from zero and lie in the
interval [0; 1] consistent with random utility maximization.
Table 3.4: Nested logit model fit diagnostics
LL -10979.11
LL -29503.89
McFadden Pseudo R-squared .6278757
Table 5.8 summarizes model fit characteristics. The McFadden Pseudo R-
squared is an indicator of the overall model fit, which is
1   LL
LL
= 1    10979:11 29503:89 = 0:628;
where LL is the log-likelihood of the test model and LL is the log-likelihood for
a reference model which is estimated with constant only, i.e. the market shares
predicted by the model are what are in the data. The NL model correctly classi-
fied 68.9% of choices with the modal category being a 4 star property in Dupont
Circle (39 %) of purchases resulting in a proportional reduction in classification
error of :689 :391 :39 = 49:0%.
In addition to modeling consumer choices, the NL model can be used to de-
termine consumer price sensitivity or elasticity as well as the monetary value of
each star rating. Table 3.5 summarizes the average (across the 11 neighborhoods
in DC) of own and cross price elasticities. Price elasticities from the NL model
are the percent change in choice probability given a percent change in price. In
Table 3.5 the diagonal (negative values) are the own price elasticities and the off
diagonal (positive values) are the cross price elasticities. For example in the first
row (1 star hotel) the choice probability decreases 1.36 % for each 1 % increase in
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the 1 star hotel’s price, whereas the 2 star property’s choice probability increases
0.02% with this same 1 percent increase. The higher star value properties tend
to be more elastic with the 4 star’s price having the largest impact on the other
star’s choice probabilities (largest cross price effects). The cells which are empty
indicate that these two types of properties were never simultaneously listed, e.g.
a 4 star property was never displayed with a 1 star property.
Table 3.5: Own and cross price elasticities by star level
Star
Star 1 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
1 -1.36 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
2 0.13 -2.86 0.11 0.26 0.16 0.22
2.5 0.24 0.12 -4.0 0.2 0.2 0.25
3 0.41 0.75 0.92 -4.83 1.03 0.9
3.5 0.53 0.67 0.53 0.64 -4.67 0.84
4 2.4 2.43 2.05 2.4 -4.55
The choice model can also be used to quantify the financial impact of dif-
ferent star ratings. Focusing on the 7505 reservations in the data set, for each
purchased property we can use the parameters from Table 3.3 to calculate the
utility of the selected property. Then decrease the star rating of the selected
property by one level (a 4 star becomes a 3.5 star) then we calculate the change
in price needed such that this decreased quality property has the same utility as
the higher quality property. Table 3.6 summaries these impacts, e.g. if a 2 star
was to change to a 1 star it would need to drop its price by $20.58 or 32% to have
the same utility (and same market share or choice probability). The higher star
ratings tend to have a higher marginal value.
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Table 3.6: Financial value of star rating
Star Price Change ($) Percentage Price Change (%)
2 20.58 32
2.5 18.2 30
3 27 35
3.5 17.06 18
4 28.44 30
The NL estimates the probability of making a sale assuming the firm is dis-
played in the choice set, in the following sectionwe estimate a logistic regression
model that estimates the probability a firm is displayed.
3.3.3 Probability of Display
Figure 3.2 shows a subset of the information a hotel (or prospective consumer)
would have available about its market for any future arrival date. The figure
shows a set of prices for hotels by star class and location withinWashington DC.
Figure 3.3 shows a map of the 11 neighborhoods within DC with each of these
11 neighborhoods potentially having one property at each star level displayed
similar to those in Figure 3.2. Not all service providers releasing inventory
to Hotwire will be displayed in Figure 3.2. For instance, there are thirteen 3.5
star properties in Dupont Circle in Washington DC, all may release inventory
to Hotwire, but given the opaque structure of Hotwire only one property is
displayed, i.e. gets an opportunity at a sale on Hotwire. Hotwire provides a
daily report to each property which can be used to determine its likelihood of
being displayed in the future. A sample daily report is displayed in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.2: Sample hotel listing on Hotwire.com
Figure 3.3: DC area neighborhoods on Hotwire.com
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The report contains summaries on price (firm and competitors), the number of
requests made as well as the number of times the firm was displayed on that
day.
Figure 3.4: Sample Hotwire.com report
Figure 3.4 summarizes all Hotwire activity made the previous day for all
future arrival dates, with each row in the report representing a future arrival
date. The data in the middle block of columns (Your Hotel Data for Today)
indicates for how many consumer searches the hotel had available inventory
(# of Times Avail) as well as the number of times it was displayed (# of Times
Disp) and the prices it had posted to Hotwire (Net rate). For example, for an
arrival on Sunday, September 30th there were 94 customer searches, of these 94
the hotel had rooms available 87 times, the hotel was displayed 75 times and 2
reservations were made.
We use this data from 6weeks of daily reports to estimate the probability that
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a hotel will be displayed on as a function of price using logistic regression. Let
Pd(p(t)) represent the probability of display for a particular arrival date posting
a price p(t) at t days prior to arrival, then
Pd(p(t)) =
1
1 + exp(g(p(t)))
(3.4)
where g(p(t)) is a linear function of p(t).
We transform price into relative price, a firm’s price divided by the displayed
comparable price. The displayed price is the price of the currently displayed ho-
tel of the same star level in the same neighborhood (e.g. 3 star hotel in Dupont
Circle). As prices change the closer you book relative to the stay date we also
include DBA, i.e. days before arrival (stay date-search date) as an independent
variable as well as an indicator variable for weekend versus weekday as week-
end prices tend to be lower than weekday.
The model specification that we estimated from our data is,
g(p(t)) =  0   1 p(t)pcompetitor(t)   2DBA   3weekend
Therefore Pd(p(t)) =
1
1 + exp( 0   1 p(t)pcompetitor(t)   2DBA   3weekend)
: (3.5)
Table 3.7 summarizes parameter estimates. Price ratio is the ratio of our price
to the comparable price. Weekend is an indicator, a 1 if the date we are pricing
is a weekend, 0 otherwise.
Figure 3.5 shows a set of sample results using (3.5) and the estimates in Table
3.7 for a firm posting prices for a weekend (Weekend = 1) arrival day (DBA = 0)
with competitors posting a price of $150.
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Table 3.7: Logistic regression coefficients for probability of display model
Parameter Coefficient Estimate
Constant 0.593
Price Ratio -1.684
DBA 0.110
Weekend -0.892
significant at the 0.001 level
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Figure 3.5: Display probabilities from logistic regression for prices posted
on arrival day for a weekend arrival with a $150 competitor
rate
3.3.4 Fraction of customers buying - making a sale on Hotwire
Section 5.8 and 3.3.3 outlined the estimated nested logit model and logistic
regression models. The nested logit model determines the probability a firm
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makes a sale given a sale is made and the firm is displayed. The logistic regres-
sion estimates the probability a firm is displayed. Figure 3.6 shows a sample
graph of the average number of requests made, referred to as looks, and the
percentage of these requests making a reservation (book-to-look ratio).
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Figure 3.6: Average number of daily request (looks) and percentage mak-
ing a reservation (book-to-look ratio)
Figure 3.6, the nested logit and logistic regression models can be used to-
gether to develop a price dependent customer arrival process. We outline two
forms of the arrival process in the following section, one assuming dynamic
prices, another for daily fixed prices.
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3.4. Pricing Model Development
We determine optimal prices under two separate frameworks, later comparing
prices and expected revenues. In Section 3.4.1 we assume dynamic pricing over
the entire selling horizon. In Section 3.4.2 we assume the firm changes prices
each day but that prices remain fixed throughout the day, for example a hotel
accepting room reservations for a stay date 3 days from today would post at
most 4 different prices for that room (potentially a different price on each of the
arrival date and each day prior to arrival). We evaluate optimal prices under
these two frameworks. Dynamic pricing provides increased revenues and al-
lows a characterization of the optimal policy. By contrast firms traditionally use
daily fixed prices largely as a result of reservation systems limitations.
3.4.1 Dynamic Pricing
Customers are assumed to arrive at Hotwire following a nonhomogeneous Pois-
son process with an arrival rate t, t days prior to arrival. We subdivide each day
prior to arrival into t decision periods of equal lengths such that there is at most
one arrival request in each period. More specifically, the value of t should be
such that the length of each decision period is small enough to have negligible
probability " of more than one arrival. The arrivals for each decision period
follow a Poisson process with rate t=t and the probability of x arrivals in a
decision period m is given by
Pm(x) =
(t=t)x exp(t=t)
x!
; (3.6)
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where x = 0; 1; 2::: and 1   Pm(0)   Pm(1)  ". For convenience, we denote the
arrival probability of one request in decision period m by Pm as,
Pm = (t=t) exp(t=t) : (3.7)
As not every arriving customer chooses to book on Hotwire, let Pb(m) be the
probability that an arrival makes a reservation (the book-to-look ratio in Figure
3.6) in decision period m. Consider a property releasing r rooms over the next m
periods at price p(m; r) who is displayed on Hotwire with choice probability Pc
given by the nested logit model (3.2).
The probability, denoted Ps, that a randomly selected customer will be will-
ing to book a room is a function of its price p(m; r) and given by
Ps(p(m; r)) = Pd(p(m; r))Pb(m)Pc(p(m; r)) (3.8)
The probability, fp(m;r), of making a sale at the price p(m; r) becomes
fp(m;r) = Ps(p(m; r))Pm
= Pd(p(m; r))Pb(m)Pc(p(m; r))Pm (3.9)
where Pd(p(m; r)) is given by (3.4), Pc(p(m; r)) is given by (3.2), and Pm is given
by (3.7) above. We can use this price dependent probability of making a sale to
determine the optimal price to post via dynamic programming.
Let V(m; r) denote the optimal total expected revenue, resulting from price
p(m; r), that can be generated from the remaining m periods given r remaining
rooms, where m = f0; 1; 2:::Mg and r = f0; 1; 2:::g. If a sale is made in period
m, then V(m; r) is equal to p(m; r) + V(m   1; r   1). If there is no sale in that
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period, then the optimal total expected revenue is given by V(m   1; r). V(m; r)
is characterized by the following recursion,
V(m; r) = max
p(m;r)
n
[p(m; r) + V(m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r) + V(m   1; r)(1   fp(m;r))
o
= V(m   1; r) + max
p(m;r)
n
[p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r)
o
(3.10)
where (m; r) = V(m; r)   V(m; r   1) is the expected marginal value of a room
in decision period m given r rooms. The boundary conditions are V(0; ) =
0;V(; 0) = 0. We next describe characteristics of the optimal pricing policy.
Optimal Dynamic Pricing Policy
The optimal dynamic pricing policy is described by Theorem 1. Lemmas 1-4 are
used in the proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 states that the optimal pricing policy
is decreasing in capacity and increasing in time. Lemmas 1,2 and 4 are similar in
structure to Lemmas 4,5 and 3 respectively in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b). We
use price as our decision variable whereas Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b) charac-
terize an optimal nested inventory allocation policy. The Corollary and Lemma
3 are unique developments with the corollary naturally following Lemmas 1
and 2, and Lemma 4 dependent upon Lemma 3.
Lemma 1. The expected marginal value is decreasing in the remaining ca-
pacity, i.e. (m; r)  (m; r   1).
Proof. By induction on m. For m = 0 the boundary condition V(0; ) = 0 gives
us (0; r) = (0; r   1) = 0, the lemma is trivially true for this case.
We assume it is true for period m   1. p(m; r) denotes the optimal solution
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for (3.10). From (3.10) above, we get
V(m; r   1) = V(m   1; r   1) + max
p(m;r 1)
n
[p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)
o
(3.11)
Then (3.10)-(3.11) gives
(m; r)   (m   1; r) = max
p(m;r)
n
[p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r)
o
  max
p(m;r 1)
n
[p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)
o
= [p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r)
 [p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1) (3.12)
From (3.12), we get
(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1) = [p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)
 [p(m; r   2)   (m   1; r   2)] fp(m;r 2) (3.13)
Similarly (3.12)-(3.13)
(m; r)   (m; r   1) = (m   1; r)   (m   1; r   1)
+[p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r)
 [p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)
 [p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)
+[p(m; r   2)   (m   1; r   2)] fp(m;r 2) (3.14)
The optimality of the price p(m; ) implies the following inequalities:
[p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)  [p(m; r)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r) (3.15)
[p(m; r   1)  (m  1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)  [p(m; r   2)  (m  1; r   1)] fp(m;r 2) (3.16)
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Substituting (3.15) and (3.16) into (3.14) we obtain
(m; r)   (m; r   1)  (m   1; r)   (m   1; r   1)
+[p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r)
 [p(m; r)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r)
 [p(m; r   2)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 2)
+[p(m; r   2)   (m   1; r   2)] fp(m;r 2) (3.17)
simplifying,
(m; r)   (m; r   1)  [(m   1; r)   (m   1; r   1)][1   fp(m;r)]
+[(m   1; r   1)   (m   1; r   2)] fp(m;r 2) (3.18)
By induction, we know that (m   1; r)   (m   1; r   1)  0 and (m   1; r   1)  
(m   1; r   2)  0. Therefore, we can conclude that (m; r)   (m   1; r)  0.
Lemma 2. The marginal value is increasing in remaining time, i.e. (m; r) 
(m   1; r).
Proof. Recall from equation (3.12), we have
(m; r)   (m   1; r) = max
p(m;r)
n
[p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r)
o
  max
p(m;r 1)
n
[p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)
o
(3.19)
As proved in Lemma 1, (m   1; r)  (m   1; r   1). Therefore, the following
inequality is always true for any value of the price p(m; r) for all m and r,
[p(; )   (m   1; r)] fp(;)  [p(; )   (m   1; r   1)] fp(;):
Thus,
max
p(m;r)
n
[p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r)
o
 max
p(m;r 1)
n
[p(m; r   1)   (m   1; r   1)] fp(m;r 1)
o
(3.20)
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which implies (m; r)  (m   1; r).
Corollary. The optimal total expected revenue V(m; r) is increasing and con-
cave in both the number of remaining periods m and rooms r.
Proof. V(m; r) increases with m and r is obvious and straightforward, so we
only focus on the concavity of the expected revenue. From Lemma 1 we know
(m; r)  (m; r   1), which implies
V(m; r)   V(m; r   1)  V(m; r   1)   V(m; r   2);
Hence, V(m; r) is concave in m.
Also,
V(m; r)   V(m   1; r) = [p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r);
and
V(m   1; r)   V(m   2; r) = [p(m   1; r)   (m   2; r)] fp(m 1;r)
and Lemma 2 gives that (m   1; r)  (m   2; r). Therefore, using the same
argument as for proving (3.20) we obtain
V(m; r)   V(m   1; r)  V(m   1; r)   V(m   2; r):
This means V(m; r) is concave in r as well.
Lemma 4 shows that the optimal price in this period is positively related to
the marginal value of the previous period. The following lemma is required in
the development of Lemma 4.
Lemma 3. Assume the property’s display probability given by (3.5) and
choice probability given by (3.2) are decreasing in price p(m; r). Then, the prob-
ability of making a sale fp(m;r) also decreases in price p(m; r).
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Proof. From the expression of fp(m;r) in (3.9), we have
fp(m;r) = Pd(p(m; r))Pb(m)Pc(p(m; r))Pm; (3.21)
It is straightforward to see that given Pb(m) and Pm do not depend on price
p(m; r) as well as both Pd(p(m; r)) and Pc(p(m; r)) are decreasing in p(m; r), one
can conclude that fp(m;r) also decreases in price p(m; r).
Lemma 4. The optimal price p(m; r) increases with the marginal value (m  
1; r):
Proof. We prove this statement by using contradiction. For ease of notation,
set  = (m   1; r) and p = p(m; r). Assume 1 and 2 are two marginal values
that satisfy 1 > 2  0. p1 and p2 are the optimal prices that maximize the term
[p(m; r)   (m   1; r)] fp(m;r) in (3.10) when (m   1; r) equals 1 and 2 respectively.
fpi ; i = 1; 2 is the corresponding probability of making a sale at optimal prices
pi .
Now suppose p1 < p

2, we attempt to get a contradiction later.
From Lemma 3, if p1 < p

2 then fp1 > fp2 .
On the other hand, the optimality of p1 implies
p1 fp1   1 fp1  p2 fp2   1 fp2
then
p1 fp1   p2 fp2  [ fp1   fp2]1
 [ fp1   fp2]2 (3.22)
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Then p1 fp1   2 fp1  p2 fp2   2 fp2 . This inequality contradicts the optimality
of p2. Therefore, we must have p

1 > p

2 if 1 > 2:
By combining Lemmas 1, 2, and 4, we obtain the next theorem that charac-
terizes the optimal pricing policy.
Theorem 1. Consider a property that releases r rooms over the next m pe-
riods at price p(m; r). Assume the property’s display probability given by (3.5)
and choice probability given by (3.2) are decreasing in price p(m; r). Then, the
optimal pricing policy for (3.10), p(m; r), is decreasing in the remaining number
of rooms r and increasing in the remaining selling periods m.
We next show an illustration using our data for which both Pd(p(m; r)) and
Pc(p(m; r)) are decreasing in p(m; r). For ease of notation, we simply denote
p(m; r) by p.
Recall from (3.5) that the display probability Pd(p) is given by
Pd(p) =
1
1 + exp( 0   1 ppcompetitor   2DBA   3weekend)
Since the estimate for the price ratio’s coefficient 1 is negative, it is straightfor-
ward to see that the display probability Pd(p) decreases in price p.
Recall from expression (3.2), the choice probability Pn(i; j) for property (i; j),
i.e. Pc, is
Pc := Pn(i; j) =
eV
0
i 
IP
i02In e
V0i0
I 
e
0xni jP
j02Jni e
0xni j0
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where,
V 0i0 = ln
X
j2Jni
e
0xni j ;
xni j = (xni jp; xn js1; xn js2; xn js3; xn js4; xn js5)0
For simplicity, we now define
E = e
0xni j ;C =
X
j0, j; j02Jni
e
0xni j0 ;H = eV
0
i 
I
;D =
X
i0,i;i02In
eV
0
i0
I
Hence,
Pc =
E
E +C
 H
H + D
Take the derivative of the terms defined above with respect to the chosen prop-
erty’s price variable xni jp and get,
@E
@xni jp
= Ep;
@C
@xni jp
= 0;
@H
@xni jp
=
HEI
E +C
p;
@D
@xni jp
= 0
Following simplification, we further obtain the derivative of Pc with respect
to xni jp is
@Pc
@xni jp
=
 HE
(E +C)2(H + D)
(C +
DEI
H + D
)

p
As shown in Table 3.3, p is negative and the terms in the brackets are all
positive. Negative first derivative with respect to price implies that the choice
probability decreases with prices. Therefore, we conclude the assumption in
Theorem 1 that the property’s display probability and choice probability are
decreasing in price p(m; r) is satisfied based on our data set.
We use Theorem 1 in the numerical implementation of (3.10) as it reduces
the set of prices that need to be searched over in the determination of p. We
illustrate a numerical example in subsequent sections. In the following section
we restrict daily prices to be fixed versus variable.
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3.4.2 Daily Fixed Pricing
Similar to dynamic pricing we use (3.8) to define the probability that a
randomly selected customer will purchase a room, Ps := Ps(p(t; r)) =
Pd(p(t; r))Pb(t)Pc(p(t; r)). We use t to represent days before arrival, withm used to
define periods in the dynamic pricing formulation. If we assume N customers
arrive over day t, then the number of people who will make a purchase at a firm
with posted price p(t; r) follows a binomial probability distribution. We denote
this number by a random variable Dn(p(t; r)) and, for 0  x  n,
P(Dn(p(t; r)) = x) = (nx)Ps(p(t; r))
x(1   Ps(p(t; r)))n x (3.23)
As the number of arrivals n is unknown with probability P(N = n), the proba-
bility, fp(t;r), of the number of people willing to buy at the price p(t; r) equal to x
becomes
fp(t;r)(x) = 1n=0P(Dn(p(t; r))) = x)P(N = n): (3.24)
As with dynamic pricing we assume customer arrivals follow a Poisson pro-
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cess then,
fp(t;r)(x) = 1n=0P(Dn(p(t; r))) = x)P(N = n)
= 1n=0(
n
x)P
x
s(1   Ps)n x
nt e
 t
n!
= 1n=x(
n
x)P
x
s(1   Ps)n x
nt e
 t
n!
= 1k=0
(k + x)!
k!x!
Pxs(1   Ps)k
(k+x)t e
 t
(k + x)!
=
xt e
 t
x!
Pxs
1
k=0(1   Ps)k
kt
k!
=
xt e
 t
x!
Pxse
t(1 Ps)
=
(tPs)xe tPs
x!
(3.25)
With daily fixed prices a property displayed releases r rooms over the next
T days, t = 0; 1; 2; :::; T . The firm changes its daily price with the remaining
capacity in order to maximize the total expected revenue. Define V(t; r) as the
maximum achievable expected revenue with r rooms and t days remaining till
the arrival day. Then V(t; r) is characterized by the following recursion,
V(t; r) = max
p(t;r)
n 1X
x=0
[p(t; r)min (r; x) + V(t   1; (r   x)+)] fp(t;r)(x)
o
: (3.26)
The boundary conditions are V(0; ) = 0;V(; 0) = 0:
We can define the expectedmarginal value of a room at day t as the following
x(t; r) =
1
x
[(V(t; r)   V(t; r   x)]
On each day, the property posts a price p(t; r) and sells x, up to r rooms. The
following day the hotel updates its price, selling up to r   x rooms, until such a
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time as it has no rooms left to sell for that arrival day, V(; 0) = 0, or the day has
passed and the rooms are valueless, V(0; ) = 0.
Unlike dynamic pricing we can not characterize all the properties of daily
fixed pricing, but the following theorem greatly reduces the search space for
finding optimal prices. The theorem is similar in nature to Theorem 3 from
Lee and Hersh (1993). Lee and Hersh (1993) develop optimal booking limits in
the presence of batch or group bookings. Lee and Hersh do not use price as a
decision variable, but the sale of multiple items over a single decision period
(batch bookings) is analogous to our daily fixed pricing policy.
Theorem 2. For fixed x and r, x(t; r) increases in t.
Proof. We first show it is true for the case that x = 1, i.e. 1(t; r)  1(t   1; r).
V(t; r)   V(t   1; r) = [V(t; r   1) + vt]   [V(t   1; r   1) + vt 1]
= [V(t; r   1)   V(t   1; r   1)] + [vt   vt 1] (3.27)
where vt denotes the expected revenue that can be generated by selling one room
over the remaining t days. It is obvious that the expected revenue that a room
can generate in t days is no less than the expected revenue that a room can
generate in t   1 days. That means vt   vt 1  0. Therefore, it follows from (3.27)
that
V(t; r)   V(t   1; r)  V(t; r   1)   V(t   1; r   1)
then,
V(t; r)   V(t; r   1)  V(t   1; r)   V(t   1; r   1)
resulting in
1(t; r)  1(t   1; r):
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Then, when x > 1, we can write
V(t; r)   V(t; r   x) = [V(t; r)   V(t; r   1)]
+[V(t; r   1)   V(t; r   2)]
+::: + [V(t; r   x + 1)   V(t; r   x)] (3.28)
From (3.27) above we note that
1(t; r)  1(t   1; r) =)
V(t; r)   V(t   1; r)  V(t; r   1)   V(t   1; r   1) =)
V(t; r)   V(t; r   1)  V(t   1; r)   V(t   1; r   1)
for any r > 1 (3.29)
Thus, combining (3.28) and (3.29) gives
V(t; r)   V(t; r   x)  V(t   1; r)   V(t   1; r   x);
i.e. x(t; r)  x(t   1; r) for any t given the fixed value of x and r.
Note that given the positive relationship between the optimal price and the
marginal value, we can characterize that the optimal pricing policy is also in-
creasing in the remaining selling time.
3.5. Numerical example
We next present a numerical example to illustrate the application of our choice
based dynamic programming model under both daily fixed pricing and dy-
namic pricing as well as the revenue gains from moving to dynamic pricing
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policies. In this example, we consider a 3 star hotel in Chantilly DC planning to
sell 5 rooms over the last 3 days prior to a Monday arrival.
Table 3.8 summarizes the average number of requests received by day be-
fore arrival, the book-look ratios and the number of subperiods for " = 0:05
(probability of more than 1 request in a subperiod  0:05).
Table 3.8: Model Parameters - Monday Arrival 3 Star Hotel in Washington
DC
Days Before Arrival
0 1 2 3
Book-to-look ratio 0.041 0.039 0.040 0.037
Average requests 341 385 233 197
# of subperiods 958 1089 656 554
We use the parameters from Table 3.3 to build the nested logit model for
estimating the probability of sale Pc given display with parameters from Table
3.7 used for the logistic regression to estimate the probability of being displayed
Pd. The book-to-look ratios in Table 3.8 provide estimates of Pb. For the dynamic
pricing model of section 3.4.1 the average requests (from Table 3.8) divided by
the number of subperiods provides the arrival rate for arrivals. The average
requests provides the rate for the fixed daily prices of section 3.4.2.
Table 3.9 displays optimal daily fixed prices. For example the firm would
post a price of $56 if it had 5 rooms to sell 3 days prior to arrival. If 2 reservations
were accepted on the third day, they would increase prices to $62 with 2 days
left (and 3 rooms remaining). Consistent with the properties of dynamic pricing,
Table 3.9 shows that prices are decreasing with increasing capacity and with
decreasing time.
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Table 3.9: Optimal Daily Fixed Prices
Days Before Arrival
Rooms 0 1 2 3
1 55 72 78 82
2 49 64 69 72
3 44 58 62 65
4 41 53 57 60
5 38 49 53 56
Figure 3.7 displays the same fixed prices as in Table 3.9 for the firm setting
prices on the arrival date for 1 to 5 rooms with series labels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4 and
F-5 (F for fixed - number of rooms). The figure also displays optimal variable
prices (in dollar price steps) throughout the arrival day, DBA 0 (period 958 the
start of the day, 0 the end). If we look at the series for 1 room (F-1 for fixed andD-
1 for dynamic) we see the dynamic price starts higher than the fixed decreasing
gradually below the fixed price. For situations with more than 1 room the prices
behave differently, with the dynamic price always less than the fixed.
Figure 3.8 shows the fixed price for the arrival day with 5 rooms to sell (F-
5). The figure also displays five separate series for the dynamic pricing. Series
D-5 assumes dynamic pricing at the start of the day with 5 rooms with D-4
assuming a room is reserved at the start of subperiod 750. The remaining series
assume another reservation is accepted every 200 subperiods. Unlike daily fixed
pricing, dynamic pricing sets prices knowing the firm will react to future sales,
potentially raising prices as capacity is decreased.
Dynamic pricing offers increased revenue opportunities. As an estimate of
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Figure 3.7: Comparing daily fixed prices versus dynamic prices for
DBA=0 and 5 rooms
these revenue gains we simply evaluate (3.10) using optimal fixed daily prices
versus optimal dynamic prices resulting in revenue gains of 5.0% from dynamic
pricing.
3.6. Summary
Incorporating customer choice behavior into revenue management has been an
active research area over the past several years. In this paper, we estimate a
nested logit model on a data from firms selling hotel rooms at Hotwire.com to
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Figure 3.8: Daily fixed prices versus dynamic prices for DBA=0 and 5
rooms)
understand the customers’ choice preferences on hotels located in Washington
D.C. Our paper is unique in that it is the first choice based revenue management
model that uses market level demand data (versus a single firm’s sales data) to
estimate the underlying demand models.
We model demand as a function of a property’s prices using the result
from the nested logit model and develop a choice-based dynamic program-
ming model with pricing as the decision variable. We propose two stochastic
dynamic programming formulations, one with daily fixed prices and one with
fully dynamic prices. We provide a complete characterization of optimal dy-
namic prices and a partial characterization for optimal daily fixed prices. We
show numerically that optimal fixed prices are consistent with the properties of
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dynamic prices. We then use these two characterizations to estimate revenue
impacts from daily fixed versus fully dynamic pricing policies.
Currently our formulation considers the firm selling capacity at the opaque
reseller, ignoring the fact that they may simultaneously release inventory across
numerous channels - both opaque like Hotwire (e.g. Priceline’s Name-Your-
Own-Price) and fully transparent (e.g. Expedia or Marriott.com). While our
formulation can be extended to incorporate the opportunity cost of releasing
rooms on other channels by including dual prices from standard revenue man-
agement models as in Anderson (2009), it currently does not directly include
consumer channel choice behavior. An interesting direction for future research
is to consider consumer choice behavior both across service providers as well as
channel selection.
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CHAPTER 4
PRICING ANDMARKET SEGMENTATION USING OPAQUE SELLING
MECHANISMS
4.1. Online Travel Sales
The pricing of services (rooms, rental cars, airline seats, etc...) online has dra-
matically changed how service firms reach customers, with online travel sales
now exceeding offline (or traditional sales channels). Initial thoughts about pric-
ing online were very positive as firms had new channels to reach customers en-
abling increased opportunities for segmentation. Over time service providers
have increased efforts to move customers back to company direct distribution
channels (company websites and call centers) in an effort to control sales costs
and commissions while maintaining direct contact with the customer to facili-
tate loyalty programs and other marketing efforts.
Hotwire and Priceline, unlike other online travel sales channels such as Ex-
pedia, Travelocity and Orbitz, offer customers opaque products with aspects of
the service provider concealed until the transaction has been completed. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows a typical service provider listing (here hotels) on a full informa-
tion channel like Expedia. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 display information available to
someone using Hotwire’s opaquemechanism. For instance a customer purchas-
ing a hotel room through Hotwire can not specify the hotel they wish to stay at,
but rather only its star rating and general location within the destination city.
Customers do not know the identity or exact location of their non-refundable
choice property until after purchase. Opaque travel sites offer service providers
a convenient channel to segment customers and distribute discounted products
73
without cannibalizing or diluting full priced products. The opaque channels
naturally segment customers as regular full price paying customers desiring
to stay at the hotel of their choice with full cancellation flexibility are unique
from those willing to purchase the discounted, non-refundable opaque prod-
uct at the unknown service provider. Similar to the opaque posted price model
of Hotwire, Priceline offers opaque services but without posted prices. Price-
line’s name-your-own-price model is similar to Hotwire where consumers, as
shown in Figure 4.4, only know the star level and region for a hotel. On Price-
line, consumers post bids for the opaque service as shown in Figure 4.5, having
to then wait for the service provider to accept to reject their offer. For a more
detailed description of Priceline’s name-your-own-price model see Anderson
(2009). While the illustrations provided in Figures 4.1-4.5 use hotels as exam-
ples, opaque services are also offered for other travel services. With air travel,
the consumer is unaware of the itinerary (connections and layover durations) or
airline andwith rental cars, the consumer does not know the type of car or rental
firm until after paying for the service. Lastminute.com, another online travel
agent, also offers opaque posted price services similar to those of Hotwire.
The level of opacity varies across the different opaque channels as some
choose to offer cancelation opportunities as in the case of Lastminute.com, pro-
vide user generated feedback as in the case of Hotwire.com, or list some of the
amenities offered by the service provider. Similarly the degree of opacity may
also be impacted by the market, as markets with fewer similar competitors offer
decreased opacity over markets with a larger number of service providers.
Opaque selling has recently started to receive interest in the the academic lit-
erature, most of the early research has focused on models similar to Priceline’s
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Figure 4.1: Typical Full Information Hotel Listing
Figure 4.2: Posted Opaque Hotel Listing
name-your-own-price (NYOP) bidding mechanism where customers post bids
for opaque services. Anderson (2009) provides a detailed background on the na-
ture of Priceline’s NYOPmodel as well as a dynamic programming basedmodel
for the setting of prices by firms on Priceline. Fay (2004) develops a stylized
model of a monopolist firm using a NYOP channel and investigates whether
repeat bidding should be allowed. Strictly speaking, Priceline does not allow
repeat bidding within a 24 hour period but there are numerous methods to cir-
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Figure 4.3: Posted Opaque City Areas
Figure 4.4: Opaque Bidding Hotel Listing
cumvent this limitation, see BiddingforTravel.com for examples. Fay indicates
that partial repeat bidding, i.e. repeat bidding by knowledgable customers may
be less profitable than complete repeat bidding. Fay (2008) extends the monop-
olist model to a duopoly model with firms pricing into two consumer segments.
One segment is loyal to a particular service provider, the second has preferences
distributed between the two firms along a line as in the traditional Hotelling
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Figure 4.5: Submitting Opaque Bid
model (Hotelling, 1929). Fay (2008) is the first paper to investigate how product
opacity affects the market. Fay studies two competing service providers selling
products to two types of customers (business and leisure) on both an opaque
posted price channel and a traditional distribution channel. Fay shows that
opaque selling benefits the monopoly service provider when customers have
heterogenous values for products. Shapiro and Shi (2008) extend the model of
Fay (2008) to N firms with the number of firms indicating the degree of opacity
- uncertainty in knowledge of service provider increases with number of firms.
Shapiro and Shi focus on providing a rationale for opaque selling. They explain
why service providers are willing to distribute products through opaque travel
sites such as Priceline and Hotwire and lose the advantage of product differen-
tiation.
Hann and Terwiesch (2003) use data from a European NYOP retailer to in-
vestigate consumer transactions costs (the cost of resubmitting bids) of using a
repeat bidding NYOP channel. In a related paper Spann et al. (2004) investi-
gate consumers’ frictional or transactions costs as well as their willingness to
pay using data from a German NYOP seller of flights from Germany to Spain.
Wang et al.(2009) develop a game theoretic model of a supplier using both reg-
ular posted price full information channels as well as a NYOP channel to reach
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heterogeneous customers. They develop a two-stage game where suppliers set
posted prices in period 1 and after observing demand in period 1, set minimally
acceptable prices at the NYOP channel in period 2. Posted prices are rigid in
period 2. Consumers observe posted prices in the first period then decide to
buy or bid in period 2. The rigidity of posted prices combined with demand
uncertainty results in the NYOP channel generating improved revenues for the
service provider. Wilson and Zhang (2008) look at a retailer setting prices on a
NYOP channel. They develop  optimal policies for the retailer that encourage
the customer to bid their maximum reservation price.
Related research looks more generally at opaque selling where prices are
posted but some aspect of the service or service provider is hidden i.e. the sell-
ing mechanism similar to that provided by Hotwire.com. Jiang (2007) develops
a Hotelling type model to illustrate how a firm should price on regular full in-
formation channels versus opaque channels. Jiang indicates that opaque selling
can be Pareto improving for both customers and suppliers when customers are
differentiated in their willingness to pay. Jiang compares opaque selling and
regular selling (selling full-information products), providing insight when to
implement opaque selling. Jerath, Netessine andVeeraraghavan (2007) compare
opaque selling with last-minute direct selling and obtain the conditions under
which opaque selling is preferred. In their model two firms of equal capacity of-
fer a differentiated service via three channels: regular posted price, posted last-
minute sales, and last-minute sales through an opaque intermediary. Their goal
is to investigate under what market conditions a firm should directly offer last-
minute discounts versus offer those discounts through an intermediary. Jerath
et al. relax the posted price rigidity ofWang et al. (2005) through introduction of
the direct last-minute discounts. They conclude that direct last-minute selling is
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preferred over the opaque intermediary when consumer valuations are high or
if the service offerings are relatively homogeneous.
While there is an extensive body of research on the use of auctions, very lit-
tle of this research looks at the simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices.
Firms can use auctions to reach customers whom may not otherwise purchase,
as posted prices may be too high. Conversely auctions potentially dilute rev-
enues as customers willing to pay posted (full prices) may purchase (at lower
prices) via the auction. The opaque nature of Priceline’s NYOP model helps to
avoid this dilution. Etizon, Pinker and Seidmann (2006) is one of the few auc-
tion related papers that looks at the simultaneous use of auctions and posted
prices. Similar to our development they look at a firm with excess supply fac-
ing consumers who strategically choose to purchase at posted prices or bid
(resorting to posted prices if their bid fails). Different from our model, con-
sumers do not face any product opacity with the auction but do incur a waiting
cost associated with bidding. Van Ryzin and Vulcano (2004) look at firm using
posted prices as well as an auction mechanism, unlike our model of endoge-
nous channel choice (strategic customers similar to Etizon et al.) they assume
separate streams of customers to each channel with the seller deciding on inven-
tory allocation across the channels. Huang and Sosic (2011) and Caldentey and
Vulcano (2007) also look at firms using auctions in concert with posted prices.
Both assume customers arrive according to a poisson process and focus on dy-
namic inventory management strategies for the seller. Huh and Janakiraman
(2008) illustrate the optimality of (s,S) inventory management policies for firms
using several different selling mechanisms (including name-your-price mecha-
nisms) in settings where firms can replenish inventory at prescribed costs. Cai
et al. (2009)investigate the potential benefits of a NYOP retailer in addition to a
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posted price channel with consumers allowed to return to posted price channels
upon failed bid attempts.
We develop a stylized model of consumers looking to acquire travel services
through either full information or opaque channels (both posted price and bid-
ding). Consumers choose their channel or sequence of channels (in the case of
bidding first followed by posted prices) that maximizes their surplus. Our pa-
per is unique from the literature in that it is the only paper that investigates
a firm using two opaque (posted and bidding) channels simultaneously with
regular full information posted price channels. Second, prior research assumes
two or more exogenous customer segments (i.e. business and leisure) with the
opaque channels targeted at the leisure or price sensitive segment; whereas we
develop endogenous consumer segments where consumers choose the chan-
nel of their choice by maximizing their surplus. Our goal is to illustrate how
opaque channels naturally segment consumers as well as how firms should
use and price into these channels as a function of the degree of their opacity.
We also discuss the segmentation and policy changes changes induced by ca-
pacity constraints. We show that simultaneously selling through regular and
opaque channels even in the presence of tight capacity constraints helps firms
to segment consumers, differentially pricing into different willingness to pay
segments and improve revenues (over the absence of opaque pricing).
4.2. Model Development
We develop a model of a firm selling to strategic consumers - consumers are
strategic as they choose the channel or sequence of channels which maximizes
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their surplus. The seller can potentially offer its products across three selling
mechanisms: a posted full information market, posted opaque market with cer-
tain aspects of the product hidden and a name your price opaque auction mech-
anism. Unlike previous research which assumes exogenous consumer behavior
wemodel endogenous consumer behavior where all consumers act strategically
as they optimally choose the channel (or sequence of channels) that maximizes
their surplus. For ease of exposition we will refer to the full information chan-
nel as the regular (REG), the opaque posted price channel as opaque (OPQ)
and the opaque channel with bidding as BID. For comparison purposes, think
of our regular channel as a firm’s website (Marriott.com, Hilton.com or USAir-
ways.com) or a typical online travel agent similar to Expedia, Orbitz or Trave-
locity, the posted opaque channel analogous to Hotwire.com, and our bidding
model similar to Priceline’s name-your-own-price model. We do not model
competition in the full information market as the firm is selling a differenti-
ated/branded product desired by consumers.
Each customer i looking to acquire service has an independent reference
price or valuation vi for the service provider. Similar to Wang et al. (2009) we
assume vi uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, i.e. its density function f (vi)
is 1 for 0  vi  1 and 0 otherwise. The service provider posts a price P1 on
the regular channel and fully discloses all service provider characteristics. The
service provider posts price P2 on the opaque posted price channel and reveals
the full information until after the purchase. The service provider also sets a
threshold price R on the opaque biding channel. The customer, if they choose
to bid, bids Bi on the bidding channel. Similar to Hann and Terwiesch (2003),
Spann et al. (2004) and Ding et al. (2005), with limited knowledge of the value
of the threshold R, customers expect R to be distributed uniformly over [0; 1]. As
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a result customers believe their bid of Bwill be accepted by the service provider
with a probability of B.
When a consumers pays P1 at the regular full information channel they are
purchasing the product from the service provider of choice, here assuming the
consumer has an affinity for this branded service provider. When the consumer
pays P2 at a posted opaque channel they know they are receiving a similar prod-
uct but they don’t know from which service provider - e.g. could be any of
10 3-Star hotels in Times Square NYC. Typically posted price opaque channels
like Hotwire.com display online the service provider whom has provided them
the lowest price - e.g. if all 10 of the aforementioned 3-Star Times Square ho-
tels offered inventory to Hotwire only the one with the cheapest price would
be posted with the opportunity for a sale. Which property is displayed would
change over time as transactions occur and inventory is sold. Priceline’s opaque
bidding channel behaves in a similar fashion except the consumer submits an of-
fer, Bi, for a 3-Star Times Square hotel, Priceline then randomly selects from the
firms that have provided it with inventory to see if they have a price that is less
than the consumers offer price. Priceline randomly rotates through all the qual-
ifying hotels (3-Star Times Square) until either a hotel with a price low enough
is found or no service provider meets the consumer’s bid. Online boards such
as BiddingForTravel.com provide resources and historic bid results to help con-
sumers in determining how to bid on Priceline. For a more exhaustive discus-
sion of Priceline see Anderson (2009).
The service provider looks to augment its full information channel with the
opaque channels in an effort to sell surplus inventory. The service provider
looks to use the opaque channels even though they yield considerately lower
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revenues (typical discounts at Hotwire and Priceline range from 25-50%). Fig-
ure 4.6 shows a set of sample reservations buildup for a 3.5 star hotel in Dupont
Circle Washington DC. The figure shows the average percentage of reservations
over the last week prior to arrival for 6 weeks of arrival dates in the fall of 2008.
The figure displays total reservations as well as those through each of Hotwire
and Priceline. As can be seen from the figure Hotwire and Priceline are typically
only used very close to the arrival day. Virtually no reservations are accepted on
opaque channels prior to 7 days before arrival whereas approximately half of to-
tal reservations have been received prior to the last week. The service provider
is using the deeply discounted opaque channels to sell distressed inventory, in-
ventory that would otherwise not be sold, over these final few days prior to
arrival. During these last few days prior to the service becoming worthless (ho-
tel bed not occupied or airline seat flying empty) the firm is in essence pricing
without capacity considerations (able to meet all demand). Whereas earlier on
in the selling process (several weeks or months prior to arrival at the hotel or de-
parture of the aircraft) the firm may not use opaque channels as it prices in con-
sideration of capacity constraints - hoping to sell all inventory at higher prices
to the brand loyal customers on the full information channels. As we will also
see in later sections, the firm also tends not to use the opaque channels if they
are not very opaque. The opaque channels become increasingly less opaque ear-
lier on in the selling process as fewer firms may tend to use them - with opacity
as in Shapiro and Shi (2008) directly related to the number of service providers
using the opaque channels.
In the following sections we outline optimal prices and the resulting market
segmentation for a service provider who has the opportunity to release their
products on the regular full information channel, an opaque posted price chan-
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Figure 4.6: Reservations buildup at Hotwire, Priceline and all channels for
3.5 star DC hotel
nel and an opaque channel with bidding. We illustrate our modeling approach
when the service provider chooses to list only on the full information channel,
optimal prices and the resulting revenue provide a basis to later compare multi-
channel strategies. Initially we focus on a firm with no capacity constraint, later
extending the formulation to a firm where demand exceeds capacity. For ease
of presentation, and without loss of generality, all revenues are normalized to a
market of one.
4.2.1 Customer Segmentation
The service provider chooses to release products only on the REG and set its
price as P1. Consumer i has surplus CS i = vi   P1, so only consumers with
valuation higher than the price P1 will purchase on this channel(Table 4.1 sum-
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marizes all model notation).
Table 4.1: Notations in the model
vi consumer i’s valuation of the product
P1 price set by the service provider on the REG channel
P2 price set by the service provider on the OPQ channel
R biding threshold set by the service provider on the BID channel
d1 the discount factor for purchasing on OPQ
d2 the discount factor for biding on BID
Bi1(vi) the bid of consumer i in the segment of BID then REG market segment
Bi2(vi) the bid of consumer i in the segment of BID then OPQ market segment
Bi3(vi) the bid of consumer i in the segment of BID only market segment
V1;V2;V4 the critical value points in the market segmentation
V3;V5;V6 the critical value points in the revenue segmentation
C the capacity constraint
Therefore, the expected revenue for the service provider  is given by
 =
Z 1
P1
P1 f (vi)dvi = P1(1   P1) = P1   P21 (4.1)
Taking the derivative of  with respect to P1 and setting it to be zero, we can
solve for the optimal price should be posted on REG: P1 =
1
2 .
Since d
2
dP12
=  2 < 0, we substituteP1 back into (4:1) and get the maximum
revenue  = 14 : Moreover, from (4:1), it is straightforward to see that the maxi-
mum revenue is concave in the prices. Figure 4.7 summarizes the segmentation
created by only pricing on the REG.
The service provider now release products on the REG, OPQ and BID si-
multaneously. They set price P1 on REG, P2 on OPQ, a bidding threshold i.e.
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Figure 4.7: Segmentation resulting from full information posted prices
the minimum acceptable bid R on BID, which is unknown to the consumers.
However consumers expect R to follow a uniform distribution over [0; 1].
The consumer surplus from purchasing on the REG is CS i = vi   P1. To al-
low comparison of consumer surplus across channels we adopt a utility frame-
work, where the utility, U(CS ), resulting from a surplus CS is assumed to be
linear, i.e. U(CS ) = d jCS + b j for j = 0; 1; 2 with j being a channel specific in-
dex (0 =REG,1 =OPQ,2 =BID). For simplicity, but without loss of generality,
we assume b j = 0 and d0 = 1 for consumers acquiring service from the full
information channel. The utility for a consumer purchasing on REG is simply
U(CS i) = vi   P1. As the consumer is not fully aware of all the service provider’s
characteristics when purchasing through OPQ we discount the consumer sur-
plus from purchasing on OPQ. Let d1 denote the discount factor for purchasing
on OPQ resulting in utility U(CS i) = d1(vi   P2) from purchasing on OPQ, where
0  d1 < 1. Here 1   d1 represents the opacity of the opaque channel, implying
as d1 approaches 1 the channel becomes less opaque as the consumer discounts
the surplus less. Similarly, we denote the degree of opacity of the products on
the BID channel by 1 d2. As indicated in Shapiro and Shi (2008) that the degree
of opacity is related to the numbers of competitors using the opaque channel.
More specifically, for example, if there are N service providers listing their prod-
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ucts on the opaque channel, i.e. not disclosing their identity, then in general the
consumer’s chance of purchasing from one of them is 1N . And so, the degree of
opacity can be interpreted as a function of 1N .
If consumer i’s valuation vi satisfying vi P1  d1(vi P2) and vi  P1, then the
consumer will prefer to purchase on the REG versus OPQ. If vi   P1 < d1(vi   P2)
and vi  P2, then they will choose OPQ to make the purchase. The customer
will be indifferent to purchasing on REG and OPQ when vi = P1 d1P21 d1 := V1.
Some consumers may bid first and switch to the REG channel if their bid
gets rejected and their valuations are higher than P1. Suppose Bi is the bid that
consumer i submits to BID, and he expects it to be accepted with a probability
of Bi. If the bid is rejected (with probability of 1   Bi in consumers’ belief), the
consumer will go to the REG and purchase the product at P1. Given vi  P1,
the utility for consumer i is then the sum of the utilities from a possible opaque
bidding purchase and in the case their bid is rejected the utility from purchasing
at regular prices,
U(CS i) = d2(vi   Bi)Bi + (1   Bi)(vi   P1): (4.2)
As U(CS i) is a concave quadratic function of Bi, it is straightforward to show
U(CS i) is maximized when Bi = Bi1(vi), where
Bi1(vi) =
P1   (1   d2)vi
2d2
: (4.3)
As bids must be positive, i.e. Bi > 0, this results in
Bi1(vi) > 0 =) vi <
P1
1   d2 := V2; (4.4)
It is easy to show that that the optimal bid is less than P1 and is decreasing in the
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opacity degree on the BID channel as the products on the BID channel become
less valuable for the customers while the BID channel becomes more opaque.
For the consumer i who chooses to bid Bi1(vi), by substituting the bid back
into (4.2) we obtain their maximum expected surplus U(CS i1(vi)) = d2(B

i1(vi))
2 +
(vi P1), which exceeds the utility, (vi P1), from buying directly from the posted
full information channel. Therefore, consumers with valuation P1  vi < V2 will
choose to bid Bi1(vi) =
P1 (1 d2)vi
2d2
first and then go to the REG channel if their bids
fails.
However, from the service provider’s perspective, the bid Bi1(vi) will be ac-
cepted only if Bi1(vi) > R i.e. vi <
P1 2d2R
1 d2 := V3. This means that customers with
valuations vi 2 [V3;V2)will lose the bid (note that they do not know it before they
bid) and go back to purchase on REG. Customers with valuation vi 2 [P1;V3)will
win the bid.
A subset of consumers may choose to bid first and switch to purchase at
the OPQ channel if their bid is rejected and vi  P2. Assume Bi is the bid that
consumer i submits to BID and he believes the accepting probability is Bi. If
the bid is rejected, the consumer will go to the OPQ and purchase at P2. Given
vi  P2, the surplus for consumer i is
U(CS i) = d2(vi   Bi)Bi + (1   Bi)(vi   P2) (4.5)
It is straightforward to show U(CS i) is maximized when Bi = Bi2(vi), where
Bi2(vi) =
d1P2   (d1   d2)vi
2d2
: (4.6)
As consumers bids must be positive, i.e. Bi > 0, this results in
Bi2(vi) > 0 =) vi <
d1P2
d1   d2 := V4; (4.7)
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One can easily show that Bi2(vi) is less than P2 and we now take the first deriva-
tive of Bi2(vi)with respect to d1 and d2 respectively and get
dBi2(vi)
d d1
=  vi   P2
2d2
 0 since vi  P2; (4.8)
dBi2(vi)
d d2
=
d1(vi   P2)
2d22
 0 since vi  P2: (4.9)
The optimal bid for customers who choose bid first and go purchase at the OPQ
channel if the bid fails is decreasing in the opacity degree on BID, but increasing
in the opacity degree on OPQ. This is because the products on the BID chan-
nel becomes less valuable for the customers while the BID channel becomes
more opaque, but becomesmore valuable when the OPQ channel becomesmore
opaque.
We substitute Bi2(vi) back and obtain the maximum expected utility for con-
sumer i is U(CS i1(vi)) = d2(B

i2(vi))
2 + d1(vi   P2), which exceeds the surplus,
d1(vi   P2), from buying directly from the OPQ channel as desired.
However, similar to the segment of BID then purchase at REG after the bid
fails, the bid Bi2(vi) will be accepted only if B

i2(vi) > R i.e. vi <
d1P2 2d2R
d1 d2 := V5.
Thus customers with valuations vi 2 [V5;V4) will lose the bid (again, they do
not know it before they bid) and switch to purchase at OPQ. Customers with
valuations vi 2 [P2;V5)will win their bid.
For consumers with valuations lower than P2, their only choice is to bid.
Their surplus is U(CS i) = d2(vi   Bi)Bi, which is maximized with Bi = Bi3(vi) =
vi=2: Service provider will only accept the bid when Bi3(vi) > R i.e. vi > 2R := V6.
This means that customers with valuations vi 2 [0;V6)will lose the bid and leave
empty handed, while customers with valuations vi 2 [V6; P2) will win their bid
and get the product.
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We now summarize the consumer self-selected market segmentation when
the service provider can list products on all three channels : REG, OPQ, and
BID and illustrate it by using critical points V1; P1;V2;V4; P2. Based on the rela-
tionship between the discount factors d1; d2 and prices P1; P2 posted on channels
REG and OPQ there are two cases of consumer market segmentation as follows:
Case I. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2)  0 , V4  V2  V1.
The three channels REG, OPQ and BID partition consumers into four poten-
tial segments as shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Market Segmentation - Case I
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Segment 1 > V2 V2  1 > V1 V1  1
[V2; 1] REG Present Absent Absent
[V1;min(V2; 1)) BID then REG Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V1; 1)) BID then OPQ Present Present Present
[0; P2) BID Present Present Present
Where, REG denotes buying on REG only; BID then REG denotes biding
then purchasing at REG if bid fails; BID then OPQ denotes biding then purchas-
ing at OPQ if bid fails; BID denotes biding only.
Case II. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0 , V4 < V2 < V1 and V1  P1  P2.
Note that this case only exists when d1 > d2, since when d1  d2, (d1   d2)P1  
d1P2(1   d2)  0:
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In this case, the three channels REG, OPQ and BID partition consumers into
four potential segments as displayed in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Market Segmentation - Case II
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Segment 1 > V1 V1  1 > V3 V3  1
[V1; 1] REG Present Absent Absent
[V3;min(V1; 1)) OPQ Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V3; 1)) BID then OPQ Present Present Present
[0; P2) BID Present Present Present
Where, REG denotes buying on REG only; OPQ denotes buying on OPQ
only; BID then OPQ denotes biding then purchasing at OPQ if bid fails; BID
denotes biding only. Figure 4.8 displays the market segmentation of these two
cases.
4.2.2 Optimal Service Provider Policies
In this section, we solve for the optimal prices and threshold set on the channels
REG, OPQ and BID respectively and the resulting maximum expected revenue
for a service provider under both segmentation cases discussed previously. As
mentioned before we assume all revenues are normalized to a market of one, as
such expected revenue values are per customer. In this section we allow the firm
to optimally set P1, P2 and R, the setting of prices and thresholds then dictates
the segmentation of consumers (and the resulting optimal revenue).
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Case I
0 1
V2 = P11 d2
V1 = P1 d1P21 d1
BiE =
d1P2 (d1 d2)vi
2d2
BiC =
P1 (1 d2)vi
2d2
BiD = vi2
BiE BiCBiD P1s V2sV1sP2s
- A -C -E- D
A - REG only customers
C - BID then REG customers
E - BID then OPQ customers
D - BID only customers
Case II
0 1
V1 = P1 d1P21 d1
V4 = d1P2d1 d2
BiE =
d1P2 (d1 d2)vi
2d2
BiD = vi2
BiEBiD V1sV4sP2s
- A -B -E- D
A - REG only customers
B - OPQ only
E - BID then OPQ customers
D - BID only customers
Figure 4.8: Market segmentation from using all three channels
As discussed earlier that Bi1(vi); B

i2(vi); and B

i3(vi) are the optimal bids for the
consumers in the segments of BID and purchase at REG if the bid fails, BID and
purchase at OPQ if the bid fails and BID only respectively. However, from the
perspective of the service provider, those bids can be accepted only when they
are more than the threshold R, i.e. Bi1(vi) > R; B

i2(vi) > R; and B

i3(vi) > R. This im-
plies consumers in those three segments will win the biding if their valuations
vi < V3; vi < V5, and vi > V6 respectively. Hence, V3;V5;V6 are critical points for
determining which channels the revenue is actually coming from. Recall that
V1; P1;V2;V4; P2 are the critical points for consumer market segmentation and
based on the relations among d1; d2; P1; and P2 there are the two segmentation
cases. From the perspective of the service provider, We now have several sce-
narios in each segmentation case as a function of d1; d2; P1; P2 and R, and display
the scenarios using critical points V1;V2;V3;V4;V5;V6; P1; and P2 as discussed in
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the following.
Case I. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2)  0 , V4  V2  V1.
Recall that the consumer segmentation given in Table 4.2.
There are three revenue scenarios in this segmentation case.
Case I - Scenario I. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2)   2d2R(1   d1)
Consumers in the first segment [V2; 1] (if V2 < 1) buy on REG directly. It is
straightforward to check that (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2)   2d2R(1 d1) is equivalent
to
P1   2d2R
1   d2 
P1   d1P2
1   d1 ; i.e. V3  V1:
Thus the segment BID then REG ([V1;min(V2; 1))) is divided into two groups of
customers with the first group vi 2 [min(V3; 1);min(V2; 1)) purchases on REG and
second group vi 2 [V1;min(V3; 1))wins the bid.
One can also easily show that V3  V1 ) V5  V1, then in the segment of
BID then OPQ (vi 2 [P2;min(V1; 1))), all consumers will win their bids since their
optimal bids are above the threshold R as long as their valuation vi  V5.
V5  V1  P1  P2 (since if P1 < P2, no one would buy on REG, i.e. there
is no REG only segment existing) ) P2  V6, then in the segment of bidding
only, consumers with valuations vi 2 [V6; P2) win their bid and consumers with
valuations vi 2 [0;V6) lose. Table 4.4 summarizes this revenue scenarios.
Therefore, if 1  V3  V1 i.e.(d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2)   2d2R(1   d1) and
P1   2d2R  1   d2, then the expected revenue  for the service provider in this
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Table 4.4: Revenue scenario, Case I - Scenario I
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V3 V3  1 > V1 V1  1
[V3; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent Absent
[V1;min(V3; 1)) BID (Bi1(vi)) Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V1; 1)) BID (Bi2(vi)) Present Present Present
[V6; P2) BID (Bi3(vi)) Present Present Present
scenario is:
 =
Z 1
V3
P1 f (vi)dvi +
Z V3
V1
Bi1(vi) f (vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
Bi2(vi) f (vi)dvi +
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi) f (vi)dvi
=
[ d1(P1   P2)2   4( 1 + d1)d22P1( 1 + 2R) + d2(( 3 + 4d1)P12 + d1P22
 2P1( 2 + d1(2 + P2))   4R2 + 4d1R2)]
4( 1 + d1)( 1 + d2)d2 (4.10)
where, recall that
Bi1(vi) =
P1   (1   d2)vi
2d2
; Bi3(vi) =
vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
d1P2   (d1   d2)vi
2d2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1   d1 ;V3 =
P1   2d2R
1   d2 ;V6 = 2R:
We take the derivatives of  in (4.10) with respect to P1; P2;R and set equal to
zero, and solve for the optimal solutions as the follows:
P1 = P

2 =
2(1   d2)
3   4d22
;R =
2d2(1   d2)
3   4d22
= d2P1 (4.11)
Furthermore, one can show that the Hessian matrix is negative-definite. Substi-
tuting optimal prices P1, P

2 and R
 into (4:10), we have the maximum expected
revenue ,
 =
1   d2
3   4d22
(4.12)
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We can see that although there are three channels and four customer segments
in this scenario, the service provider only has two sources of revenue: REG and
BID as the OPQ channel is not generating sales. This is because the price on
OPQ is set the same as that on REG and the threshold on the BID channel is set
relatively low so that all the consumers in the segment of BID then OPQ will
win their bids and will not switch to OPQ.
Parameters d1; d2 need to satisfy constraints obtained by substituting optimal
prices P1, P

2 and R
 as shown in (4.11) into the conditions in this scenario: (d1  
d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2)   2d2R(1   d1); P1   2d2R  1   d2; and P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1]:
Here, the constraint is just simply 0  d2  1=2. Under this constraint, one can
show that both the optimal full information price and the maximum expected
revenue in this scenario are more than in the situation where there is only the
REG channel, which are 12 and
1
4 respectively. Please see the Appendix for the
detailed derivation of the results discussed above.
Case I - Scenario II. 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1   d1) and P2  2R:
As in the previous scenario, the consumers in the first segment [V2; 1] (if V2 <
1) buy on REG directly. It is easy to see that (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) >  2d2R(1 d1)
is equivalent to
P1   2d2R
1   d2 <
P1   d1P2
1   d1 ; i.e. V3 < V1:
Thus, all the consumers in the segment of BID then REG ([V1;min(V2; 1)))lose
their bids and go to purchase at REG as their bids are below the threshold R if
their valuation is more than V3.
One can easily show that V3 < V1 implies V5 < V1 and if P2  2R; then P2  V5,
so the segment of BID then OPQ (vi 2 [P2;min(V1; 1))) consists of two groups of
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consumers. The first group of consumers with valuations vi 2 [V5;min(V1; 1))
purchase on OPQ and second group vi 2 [P2;min(V5; 1))win their bids.
P2  2R indicates P2  V6, then in the segment of bidding only, consumers
with valuations vi 2 [V6; P2) win their bid and consumers with valuations vi 2
[0;V6) lose. The revenue for the service provider in this scenario is summarized
in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Revenue scenarios, Case I - Scenario II
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V1 V1  1 > V5 V5  1
[V1; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent Absent
[V5;min(V1; 1)) OPQ (P2) Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V5; 1)) BID (Bi2(vi)) Present Present Present
[V6; P2) BID (Bi3(vi)) Present Present Present
Thus, if 1  V1 > V3 and 1  V5  P2 i.e. 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >
 2d2R(1  d1); P1   d1P2  1  d1 and P2  2R, then the expected revenue  for the
service provider in this scenario is:
 =
Z 1
V1
P1 f (vi)dvi +
Z V1
V5
P2 f (vi)dvi +
Z V5
P2
Bi2(vi) f (vi)dvi +
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi) f (vi)dvi
=
[4d2(P1   P12 + P1P2   2P2R) + d12( 4P1( 1 + P2) + P22   4R2)
+
d1(4P12 + 4P1( 1 + d2( 1 + P2)   P2) + (3   4d2)P22 + 8d2P2R + 4R2)]
4( 1 + d1)(d1   d2) (4.13)
where, recall that
Bi3(vi) =
d2vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
P2   (d1   d2)vi
2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1   d1 ;V5 =
d1P2   2d2R
d1   d2 ;V6 = 2R:
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As earlier, taking the derivatives of  in (4.13) with respect to P1; P2;R and
setting to zero, we solve for the optimal solutions.
P1 =
d13 + d12(3   4d2)   4d22 + 4d1d22
2(d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
P2 =
d1(1 + d1)(d1   d2)
d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22
;
R =
d2(1 + d1)(d1   d2)
d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22
(4.14)
One can show that the Hessian matrix is negative-definite and substituting op-
timal prices P1, P

2 and R
 in (4:13), one can get the maximum expected revenue
,
 =
d13 + d12(3   4d2)   4d22 + 4d1d22
4(d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
(4.15)
As before parameters d1; d2 need to satisfy a set of constraints; which are
obtained by substituting optimal prices P1, P

2 and R
 as shown in (4.14) into:
0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1   d1); P1   d1P2  1   d1; P2  2R; and
P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1]:
Hence, the constraints that d1; d2 need to satisfy are shown in (4.16), (4.17),
(4.18), and (4.19). Similar to the previous scenario, under these constraints, one
can show that both the optimal full information price and the maximum ex-
pected revenue in this scenario are larger than 12 and
1
4 respectively. The ap-
pendix provides the detailed derivation.
d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22  0 (4.16)
d2  d12 (4.17)
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4d23 + d12( 1 + 2d2) + d1(d2   6d22) < 0 (4.18)
4d1d22   4d23 + d13( 1 + 2d2) + d12(d2   2d22)  0 (4.19)
Case I - Scenario III. 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1   d1) and P2 < 2R.
As in previous scenarios, consumers in the first segment [V2; 1] (if V2 < 1)
buy on REG directly. And (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1   d1) implies
P1   2d2R
1   d2 <
P1   d1P2
1   d1 ; i.e. V3 < V1:
Hence, all the consumers in the segment BID then REG ([V1;min(V2; 1))) lose
their bids and purchase at the REG channel as their bids are below the threshold
R if their valuation is more than V3.
If P2 < 2R, then V5 < P2, so all consumers in the segment of BID then OPQ
lose their bids and switch back to the OPQ channel to buy as their bids are less
than the threshold R if the valuation vi > V5.
P2 < 2R also indicates P2 < V6, then in the segment of bidding only, all
consumers will lose their bid as Bi < R if their valuation is less than V6. Table 4.6
summarizes these revenue scenarios.
Table 4.6: Revenue scenarios, Case I - Scenario III
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V1 V1  1 > P2
[V1; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent
[P2;min(V1; 1)) OPQ (P2) Present Present
Therefore, if 1  V1 and P2  V5 i.e. 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1  
d1); P1   d1P2  1   d1 and P2 < 2R, then every possible transaction interval in
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Table 4.6 is present and produces :
 =
Z 1
V1
P1 f (vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
P2 f (vi)dvi
=
(1   d1   P1 + d1P2)P1 + P2(P1   P2)
1   d1 (4.20)
Taking the first partial derivatives of with respect to P1 and P2 respectively
and setting them to zero,
P1 =
2
3 + d1
; P2 =
1 + d1
3 + d1
(4.21)
It is easy to show that the Hessian matrix is again negative-definite, sub-
stituting P1 and P

2 in (4.21) into (4.20), and we have the maximum expected
revenue  is:
 =
1
3 + d1
(4.22)
As shown above REG and OPQ are the only two channels with sales. This hap-
pens when the threshold on the BID channel is set so high that the consumers
in both BID then OPQ segment and the BID only segment lose their bid. In fact,
from the conditions 0  (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) >  2d2R(1 d1); P1 d1P2  1 d1
and P2 < 2Rwe can see that
R > max
(
P2
2
;
 (d1   d2)P1 + d1P2(1   d2)
2d2(1   d1)
)
:
By substituting P1 and P

2 shown in (4.21) back into the inequality above, we
have
R > max
(
1 + d1
2(3 + d1)
;
2d2   d1(1   d2)
2d2(3 + d1)
)
:
Since
2d2   d1(1   d2)
2d2(3 + d1)
  1 + d1
2(3 + d1)
=
d2   d1
6d2 + 2d1d2
;
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so the lower bound of the optimal threshold
RL =
8>>>><>>>>:
2d2 d1(1 d2)
2d2(3+d1)
if d1 < d2
1+d1
2(3+d1)
otherwise
(4.23)
Therefore, the optimal threshold R 2 [RL; P2]. Substituting the optimal solutions
P1; P

2, and R
 > P2=2 back in the conditions 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >
 2d2R(1   d1); P1   d1P2  1   d1 and P2 < 2Rwe get the constraint that d1 and d2
need to satisfy d1  2d2=(1  d2). It is easy to see that  2d2=(1  d2) > d2, thus, the
lower bound of the optimal threshold becomes
RL =
8>>>><>>>>:
2d2 d1(1 d2)
2d2(3+d1)
if d1 < d2
1+d1
2(3+d1)
if d2  d1  2d21 d2
(4.24)
One can check that under this constraint the optimal REG price and the max-
imum expected revenue in this scenario are greater than or equal to those values
in the situation where there is only REG channel i.e. 12 and
1
4 respectively. The
details are provided in the Appendix.
Case II. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0 , V4 < V2 < V1.
Themarket segmentation in Case II was previously summarized in Table 4.3.
Note that this case only exists when d1 > d2, since when d1  d2, d1P2(1   d2)  
(d1   d2)P1 > 0:
V4 = d1P2d1 d2 ;V5 =
P2 2R
d1 d2 implies V4  P2; and V4  V5. Recall that the consumers
with valuations vi < V5 and vi > V6 will win their bid. Hence, we only need to
compare the critical points V5, P2 and V6 to determine revenue, resulting in two
revenue scenarios based on d1; d2; P1; P2; and R as discussed in the following .
Case II - Scenario I. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0 and 2R  P2.
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Recall that the segment [V1; 1] (if V1 < 1) and [V4;min(V1; 1)) are the segment
of REG only and OPQ only segments respectively. If 2R  P2, then V5  P2  V6,
then the segment of BID then OPQ (vi 2 [P2;min(V4; 1))) consists of two groups
of consumers. The first group of consumers with valuation vi 2 [V5;min(V4; 1))
purchases on OPQ and second group vi 2 [P2;min(V5; 1)) have winning bids.
And in the segment of bidding only, consumers with valuation vi 2 [V6; P2) win
their bid and consumers with valuation vi 2 [0;V6) lose. Table 4.7 summarizes
revenue scenarios.
Table 4.7: Revenue segmentation, Case II - Scenario I
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V1 V1  1 > V5 V5  1
[V1; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent Absent
[V5;min(V1; 1)) OPQ (P2) Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V5; 1)) BID (Bi2(vi)) Present Present Present
[V6; P2) BID (Bi3(vi)) Present Present Present
Thus, if V1  1 and V5  P2  V6 i.e. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0 and
P1   d1P2  1   d1 and 2R  P2, then every possible transaction interval in Table
4.7 is present, with  for the service provider in this scenario:
 =
Z 1
V1
P1 f (vi)dvi +
Z V1
V5
P2 f (vi)dvi +
Z V5
P2
Bi2(vi) f (vi)dvi +
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi) f (vi)dvi(4.25)
where, recall that
Bi3(vi) =
d2vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
P2   (d1   d2)vi
2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1   d1 ;V5 =
d1P2   2d2R
d1   d2 ;V6 = 2R:
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As in Case I, Scenario II above the service provider uses all three channels
by setting the appropriate threshold and prices on the channels. And it has
the same revenue expression (4.25) but with slightly different parameter con-
straints. Therefore, the optimal prices and expected revenue in this scenario are
also given by (4.14), (4.15) above respectively. One can derive the parameter
constraints that need to be satisfied in this scenario by substituting P1; P

2 and R

in (4.14) into conditions (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0; P1   d1P2  1   d1; 2R 
P2; P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1]; and P2  P1:
Specifically, the constraints are (4.16), (4.17), (4.18), and
4d1d22   4d23 + d13( 1 + 2d2) + d12(d2   2d22) < 0; (4.26)
whose inequality sign is the opposite of the fourth condition (4.19) in Case I,
Scenario II.
Case II - Scenario II. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0 and P1   d1P2  1   d1 and
2R > P2.
Consumers in the segment of [V1; 1] (if V1 < 1) and [V4;min(V1; 1)) buy at
REG only and OPQ only respectively. If 2R > P2, then V5 < P2 < V6, for both the
segments of BID then OPQ (vi 2 [P2;min(V4; 1))) and BID only (vi 2 [0; P2), there
are no consumers with winning bids.
Table 4.8: Revenue segmentation, Case II - Scenario II
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V1 V1  1 > P2
[V1; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent
[P2;min(V1; 1)) OPQ (P2) Present Present
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Therefore, with 1  V1 and P2  V5 i.e. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0 and
P1   d1P2  1   d1 and 2R > P2 the resulting expected revenue :
 =
Z 1
V1
P1 f (vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
P2 f (vi)dvi (4.27)
Substituting optimal prices P1 and P

2; as shown in 4.21 and R
 > P2=2 back
in the conditions (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0 and P1   d1P2  1   d1 and 2R > P2
and P2 < 2R we get d1 > 2d2=(1   d2) as the parameter constraints in scenario.
Note that this is just with an opposite sign from the parameter condition in Case
I - Scenario III. As R > P2=2, we have the lower bound of the optimal threshold
RL = P

2=2 =
1 + d1
2(3 + d1)
;
and the optimal threshold will still be R 2 [RL; P2].
Overall, in the situation where the service provider releases their products
on all three channels: REG, OPQ and BID, we have five scenarios of revenue
generation as summarized in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Revenues, prices and bidding threshold summaries
Scenario Optimal price Optimal price Optimal threshold Maximum expected Parameter
on REG (P1) on OPQ (P

2) on BID (R
) revenue () conditions
(d1; d2)
Case I-I 2(1 d2)
3 4d22
2(1 d2)
3 4d22
2d2(1 d2)
3 4d22
1 d2
3 4d22 0  d2 
1
2
Case I-II d1
3+d12(3 4d2) 4d22+4d1d22
2(d13 d12( 2+d2)+d1d2 4d22)
d1(1+d1)(d1 d2)
d13 d12( 2+d2)+d1d2 4d22
d2(1+d1)(d1 d2)
d13 d12( 2+d2)+d1d2 4d22
d13+d12(3 4d2) 4d22+4d1d22
4(d13 d12( 2+d2)+d1d2 4d22) (4.16), (4.17),
(4.18), (4.19)
Case I-III 23+d1
1+d1
3+d1
[2d2 d1(1 d2)2d2(3+d1) ;
1+d1
3+d1
] 13+d1 d1 < d2
2
3+d1
1+d1
3+d1
[ 1+d12(3+d1) ;
1+d1
3+d1
] 13+d1 d2  d1  2d21 d2
Case II-I Same as Case I-II (4.16), (4.17),
(4.18), (4.26)
Case II-II 23+d1
1+d1
3+d1
[ 1+d12(3+d1) ;
1+d1
3+d1
] 13+d1 d1 >
2d2
1 d2
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Illustration of the Optimal Policies
In this section we illustrate optimal policies and the resulting segmentation sub-
stituting different values of d1 and d2 into the closed-form solutions discussed
previously and plot them to illustrate the impact of channel opacity on the rev-
enue, prices, and threshold.
We plot the maximum expected revenue that the service provider can obtain
while releasing products on REG, OPQ and BID channels and the corresponding
optimal prices and threshold set on those channels as given in (4.9). It is analyt-
ically illustrated in the Appendix that the maximum expected revenue and the
posted price on REG in all five scenarios are more than those in the base case:
REG only, so the maximum expected revenue and corresponding posted price
on REG in this three channel case are also greater than those values in the REG
only case ( 14 and
1
2 respectively). One can also see this property in the plots. Fig-
ure 4.9 plots optimal expected revenues resulting from optimal full information
prices (Figure 4.10), optimal opaque prices (Figure 4.11) and optimal bidding
thresholds (Figure 4.12).
As shown in Figures 4.10, 4.11 prices on REG decrease as BID and OPQ be-
come less opaque, conversely OPQ prices increase (and converge to REG prices)
as opacity on OPQ decreases, but decreases as opacity on BID decreases. Fig-
ure 4.12 shows that BID thresholds increase as opacity on BID decreases, but
decreases as opacity on OPQ decreases. The impacts of channel opacity on op-
timal prices and threshold indicate that when the products on the opaque chan-
nels (OPQ and BID) become more valuable (less opaque), the price on the full
information channel (REG) can not be set too high to lose consumers. Similarly,
if the BID channel becomes less opaque, some consumers on OPQ may switch
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Figure 4.9: Optimal expected revenue
to bid on the BID channel due to a potential chance of getting a better value with
less price.
As displayed in Figure 4.9 the expected revenue decreases when either OPQ
or BID channel opacity degree decreases (d’s increase). This implies that the
more opaque those opaque channels are, the more segments in the market and
so the service provider can capture more consumers because of their heteroge-
nous valuations of the product.
4.2.3 Optimal Service Provider Policies with Limited Capacity
In this section, we consider a service provider with limited capacity and as such
the firm would logically limit sales at lower prices. We assume that the service
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Figure 4.10: Optimal regular prices
provider has a limited inventory of capacity C < 1. Although we have the ca-
pacity constraint in this case, the consumer segmentation and the revenue seg-
mentation will still be the same as the case with abundant capacity discussed in
earlier sections. However, the effective segments (those which generate sales),
the optimal pricing policy and the maximum expected revenue that the service
provider can achieve will depend on capacity.
As the firm is simultaneously using all three channels we assume the cus-
tomer segments arrive in a random order, i.e. first come first serve. Thus, the
capacityC will be allocated to each segment of the market proportional to it size
relative to the total demand in the market, otherwise referred to as random or
proportionate splitting.
As an illustration on how the limited capacity influences the service
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Figure 4.11: Optimal opaque prices
provider’s pricing policy and maximum revenue that can be achieved, we as-
sume that the service provider sells the products only on the REG channel and
set its price as P1.
Similar to the situation with no capacity constraint, consumers with valu-
ation higher than the price P1 will purchase through this channel. However,
demand can be met only up to C. In other words, when the total demand
1   P1  C, the situation is exactly the same as the case with no capacity con-
straint discussed previously, and so the revenue is C = (1 P1)P1, which reaches
the maximum value C =
1
4 at P

1C =
1
2 . But when 1   P1 > C, the revenue is
C = CP1. Thus, the price P1 increases until it reaches the upper bound 1 C and
the maximum revenue C = C(1  C) is achieved.
We summarize the results as the following:
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Figure 4.12: Optimal bidding thresholds
If 1  C  12 i.e. C  12 , then C = 14 and P1C = 12 ;
If 1  C > 12 i.e. C < 12 , then C = C(1  C) and P1C = 1  C.
One can easily show that when C < 12 , 

C = C(1 C) is an increasing function
in the capacity C, and P1C is decreasing in C. These are quite intuitive as when
we can not meet all demand we receive less revenue but through higher prices.
The service provider now lists the products on the REG, OPQ and BID si-
multaneously. They set price P1 on REG, P2 on OPQ, a biding threshold R on
BID.
Constrained Case I.
Capacity C is allocated proportionally and from (4.10) we know that the total
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demand that is supposed to be met if we have enough capacity is 1   2R. Thus,
if the conditions (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2)   2d2R(1   d1); P1   2d2R  1   d2; are
satisfied andC  1 2R, then the expected revenue C is the same as the revenue
 in the unconstrained case. If C < 1   2R, then the expected revenue C is :
C =
R 1
V3
f (vi)dvi
1   2R C  P1 +
R V3
V1
f (vi)dvi
1   2R C 
R V3
V1
Bi1(vi) f (vi)dviR V3
V1
f (vi)dvi
+
R V1
P2
Bi2(vi) f (vi)dvi
1   2R C 
R V1
P2
Bi2(vi) f (vi)dviR V1
P2
f (vi)dvi
+
R P2
V6
Bi3(vi) f (vi)dvi
1   2R C 
R P2
V6
Bi3(vi) f (vi)dviR P2
V6
f (vi)dvi
=
C
1   2R [
Z 1
V3
P1 f (vi)dvi +
Z V3
V1
Bi1(vi) f (vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
Bi2(vi) f (vi)dvi
+
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi) f (vi)dvi]
=
C
1   2R   (4.28)
where,
Bi1(vi) =
P1   (1   d2)vi
2d2
; Bi3(vi) =
vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
d1P2   (d1   d2)vi
2d2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1   d1 ;V3 =
P1   2d2R
1   d2 ;V6 = 2R;
 = the revenue of the Case I-Scenario I without a capacity constraint.
Constrained Case II
Case I - Scenario II and Case II - Scenario I have the same revenue functions
in terms of P1; P2;R; d1 and d2 as shown in (4.13), but with different parame-
ter constraints. Thus, in the case with capacity constraint C we combine these
two scenarios together, and similar to the Constrained Case I above, the total
demand that we need to meet if we have abundant capacity is 1   2R.
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If the conditions of the scenarios (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) >  2d2R(1 d1); P1 
d1P2  1   d1; P2  2R; are satisfied and C  1   2R, the expected revenue C is
the same as the revenue  in the case of no capacity constraint. If C < 1  2R, the
expected revenue C with capacity C is given as below:
C =
R 1
V1
f (vi)dvi
1   2R C  P1 +
R V1
V5
f (vi)dvi
1   2R C  P2 +
R V5
P2
f (vi)dvi
1   2R C 
R V5
P2
Bi2(vi) f (vi)dviR V5
P2
f (vi)dvi
+
R P2
V6
f (vi)dvi
1   2R C 
R P2
V6
Bi3(vi) f (vi)dviR P2
V6
f (vi)dvi
=
C
1   2R [
Z 1
V1
P1 f (vi)dvi +
Z V1
V5
P2 f (vi)dvi +
Z V5
P2
Bi2(vi) f (vi)dvi
+
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi) f (vi)dvi]
=
C
1   2R   (4.29)
where,
Bi3(vi) =
d2vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
P2   (d1   d2)vi
2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1   d1 ;V5 =
d1P2   2d2R
d1   d2 ;V6 = 2R;
 = the revenue of the Case II-Scenario I or Case II-Scenario I in the case with no
capacity constraint.
Constrained Case III.
Recall that Case I-Scenario III and Case II-Scenario II have the same revenue
functions of P1; P2;R; d1 and d2 as given in (4.20) but with different parameter
constraints. Hence, we combine these two scenarios together in the setting with
constrained capacity and note the total demand that we need to meet if we have
abundant capacity is now 1   P2.
Thus, if the conditions (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) >  2d2R(1 d1); P1 d1P2  1 
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Figure 4.13: Optimal expected revenue-left capacity=0.55, right capacity=0.40
d1; P2 < 2R in the scenarios are satisfied andC  1 P2, then the expected revenue
C with capacity C is the same as the expected revenue  with no constrained
capacity. If C < 1   P2, then the expected revenue C given as the follows.
C =
R 1
V1
f (vi)dvi
1   P2 C  P1 +
R V1
P2
f (vi)dvi
1   P2 C  P2
=
C
1   P2 [
Z 1
V1
P1 f (vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
P2 f (vi)dvi]
=
C
1   P2   (4.30)
where,
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1   d1 :
 = the revenue of the Case I-Scenario II or Case II Scenario II sub-scenario I-ii
with no capacity constraint.
We solve for the optimal prices, threshold and the resulting maximum ex-
pected revenue. The resulting optimal revenues, prices and thresholds for ca-
pacities of 0.55 and 0.40 are shown in Figures 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 respec-
tively.
111
OPQ discount factor (d1)
B
ID
 d
isc
ou
nt
 fa
ct
or
 (d
2) 0.520.560.60.640.68
0.68
0.64
0.6
0.56
0.52
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
OPQ discount factor (d1)
B
ID
 d
isc
ou
nt
 fa
ct
or
 (d
2)
0.640.660.70.740.78
0.64
0.66
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure 4.14: Optimal regular prices-left capacity=0.55, right capacity=0.40
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Figure 4.15: Optimal opaque prices - left capacity=0.55, right capacity=0.40
Figure 4.16: Optimal bidding thresholds - left capacity=0.55, right capacity=0.40
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4.3. Discussion
Figure 4.17 illustrates the the impact of capacity constraints upon expected rev-
enue for a series of opacity levels. As the figure illustrates firms are not overly
impacted by capacity limitations until capacity levels below 0.55. With capacity
levels between 0.55 and 1 they can capture potential lost revenue opportuni-
ties via higher prices. Comparison of Figures 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 with Figures
4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 shows how firms increase prices and thresholds as capacity
decreases. The impacts of these increased prices and thresholds upon segmenta-
tion is illustrated in Figure 4.18. The left panels in Figure 4.18 display the chan-
nels across which the service provider conducts transactions provided they set
optimal prices and thresholds. These transactions are a function of consumer
self-selected segmentation as illustrated by the right panels in Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.17: Optimal expected revenue as a function of capacity
Together these figures illustrate the impacts of opaque selling and under
what conditions it appears fruitful to consumers and service providers. Firms
should always adopt at least two channels, selling via opaque posted prices
113
OPQ discount factor (d1)
B
ID
 d
isc
ou
nt
 fa
ct
or
 (d
2)
REG, OPQ
REG, OPQ, BID
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
OPQ discount factor (d1)
B
ID
 d
isc
ou
nt
 fa
ct
or
 (d
2) BID then REG, BID then OPQ, BID
REG, BID then REG, BID then OPQ, BID
REG, OPQ, BID then OPQ, BID
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Capacity=1
OPQ discount factor (d1)
B
ID
 d
isc
ou
nt
 fa
ct
or
 (d
2)
REG, OPQ
REG, OPQ, BID
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
OPQ discount factor (d1)
B
ID
 d
isc
ou
nt
 fa
ct
or
 (d
2) BID then REG, BID then OPQ, BID
REG, BID then REG, BID then OPQ, BID
REG, OPQ, BID then OPQ, BID
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Capacity=0.55
OPQ discount factor (d1)
B
ID
 d
isc
ou
nt
 fa
ct
or
 (d
2)
REG, OPQ
REG, OPQ, BID
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
OPQ discount factor (d1)
B
ID
 d
isc
ou
nt
 fa
ct
or
 (d
2) BID then REG, BID then OPQ, BID
REG, BID then REG, BID then OPQ, BID
REG, OPQ, BID then OPQ, BID
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Capacity=0.40
Figure 4.18: Revnue generating channels (left) and consumer segmentation
(right)
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in addition to regular full information prices. The opaque posted prices sim-
ply approach regular full information prices as the opaque channel becomes
less opaque - this is consistent across unlimited and constrained capacity set-
tings. Similarly firms should employ opaque bidding but only when opacity of
this channel is significant - for example when d2 < 12 for capacity of 0:55 with
a decreasing desire to use as capacity becomes tightly constrained (d2 < 14 for
capacity=0:4). It is important to realize that the firm should always be using all
three channels, with posted opaque prices/thresholds set too high such that no
transactions occur under conditions of decreased opacity. As capacity becomes
tighter, the required degree of opacity increases (for continued use of opaque
channels) as do prices and thresholds.
As indicated earlier, and as displayed in Figures 4.9 and 4.13 that the max-
imum expected revenue decreases as opacity decreases. This implies that the
more opaque those opaque channels are, the more segments in the market and
so the service provider can capture more consumers because of their heteroge-
nous valuations of the product. This is consistent with what we see in practice
as opaque channels tend to separate themselves along degrees of opacity, for ex-
ample Hotwire.com provides information of hotel amenities as well as feedback
from recent guests whereas Priceline.com provides neither on its NYOP bidding
channel indicating Hotwire is probably less opaque than Priceline. As a result
of this prices on Hotwire and less than those on full information channels but
higher than bids typically accepted at Priceline.
In summary we have developed a stylized model of when and how to de-
ploy an opaque selling strategy in concert with regular full information pricing.
Unlike previous research which usually assumes an exogenous consumer sepa-
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ration into regular consumers and opaque consumers we endogenously model
this channel selection process as a function of prices and channel characteristics
(opacity). We have shown that even in the face of capacity constraints firms
should be simultaneously using opaque channels in concert with regular chan-
nels whereas historically focus has been on using opaque channels to sell dis-
tressed or otherwise unsellable inventory (surplus capacity). The simultaneous
use of opaque selling with regular full information selling effectively segments
consumers - allowing firms to sell at higher prices to higher valuation/brand
loyal consumers and at lower prices to lower valuation/brand agnostic shop-
pers via opaque channels and increase firm revenues.
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Appendix
This section includes the detailed discussion and derivation for some of the re-
sults in Case I - Scenarios I, II and III in section 4.2.2.
Case I - Scenario I.
Here, we derive the constraints that parameters d1; d2 need to satisfy in this
sub-scenario by substituting optimal prices P1, P

2 and R
 as shown in (4.11) into
the conditions in this scenario: (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2)   2d2R(1 d1); P1 2d2R 
1   d2; P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1];.
0  P1  1 ) 0  d2 
p
5 + 1
4
;
(d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2)   2d2R(1   d1)
) (d1   d2)   d1(1   d2)   2d22(1   d1) ) 0  d2  12;
P1   2d2R  1   d2
) 2(1   2d2
2)
3   4d22
 1 which is true given 0  d2  12 above: (4.31)
Therefore, we obtain the constraint that the parameter d2 needs to satisfy,
which is 0  d2  1=2. Under this constraint, one can show that both the optimal
full information price and the maximum expected revenue in this sub-scenario
are more than those values in case I where there is only the REG channel, which
are 1=2 and 1=4 respectively, since we have the follows:
P1  
1
2
=
2(1   d2)
3   4d22
  1
2
=
(1   2d2)2
3   4d22
 0 if d2  12
   1
4
=
1   d2
3   4d22
  1
4
=
(1   2d2)2
4(3   4d22)
 0 if d2  12
Case I - Scenario II.
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Similar to the above scenario, we derive the constraints that parameters d1; d2
need to satisfy by substituting optimal prices P1, P

2 and R
 as shown in (4.14)
into the conditions in this sub-scenario: 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) >  2d2R(1 
d1); P1   d1P2  1   d1; P2  2R; and P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1].
P2  0 ) d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22  0 (4.32)
P2  2R ) d2  d12 (4.33)
(d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1   d1)
) ( 1 + d1)d1(4d2
3 + d12( 1 + 2d2) + d1(d2   6d22))
2(d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
> 0
) 4d23 + d12( 1 + 2d2) + d1(d2   6d22) < 0 (4.34)
since constraint (4.32) above and d1  1
0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2)
) ( 1 + d1)(4d1d2
2   4d23 + d13( 1 + 2d2) + d12(d2   2d22))
2(d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
 0
) 4d1d22   4d23 + d13( 1 + 2d2) + d12(d2   2d22)  0 (4.35)
since constraint (4.32) above and d1  1
On the other hand, constraint (4.33) d2  d1=2 ) d12 + 2d1d2   4d22  0; so
combining this with constraint (4.32) gives us the following:
P1   1 =   (1 + d1)(d1
2 + 2d1d2   4d22)
2(d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
 0
P1   d1P2
1   d1   1 =  
d12 + 2d1d2   4d22
2(d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
 0
Therefore, (4.32), (4.33), (4.34), and (4.35) are the constraints that parameters
d1; d2 need to satisfy in this scenario in order that the optimal solutions (4.14)
and optimal expected revenue (4.15) are feasible.
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Under the constraints (4.32), (4.33), (4.34), and (4.35), one can show that both
the optimal full information price and the maximum expected revenue in this
scenario are also more than 1=2 and 1=4 respectively. In fact, we have
   1
3 + d1
=
(1 + d1)2(d1   2d2)2
4(3 + d1)(d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
 0 given condition (4.32) (4.36)
On the other hand,
1
3 + d1
 1
4
for 0  d1 < 1:
Therefore,   1=4. Since P1 = =2, so Pi  1=2.
Case I - Scenario III. Similarly, we obtain the constraints that d1:d2 need to
satisfy by plugging the optimal solutions P1; P

2; and R
 into the conditions 0 
(d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) >  2d2R(1  d1); P1   d1P2  1  d1 and P2 < 2R. Note that
P1 = 2P

2=(1 + d1), R
 > P2=2; P1 2 [0; 1]; and P2 2 [0; 1].
In fact,
(d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) + 2d2R(1   d1)
> P2[
2
1 + d1
(d1   d2)   d1(1   d2) + d2(1   d1)]
= P2[
2
1 + d1
(d1   d2)   (d1   d2)]  P2[d1   d2   (d1   d2)]  0;
(4.37)
P1   d1P2
1   d1   1 =
 1
3 + d1
< 0;
(d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) =
(1   d1)(d1   d1d2   2d2)
3 + d1
 0 ) d1  2d21   d2
(4.38)
Thus, d1  2d2=(1   d2) is the parameter constraint in this scenario.
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It is easy to see that the optimal full information price 23+d1 and the maximum
expected revenue 13+d1 in this scenario are greater than or equal to those values in
the situation where there is only the REG channel i.e. 1=2 and 1=4 respectively,
since we have the following:
P1 =
2
3 + d1
>
2
3 + 1
=
1
2
; and  =
1
3 + d1
>
1
3 + 1
=
1
4
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CHAPTER 5
CUSTOMER PREFERENCES AND OPAQUE INTERMEDIARIES
5.1. Introduction
The selling of services (hotel rooms, rental cars, airline seats, etc...) online has
dramatically changed how service firms reach customers, with online travel
sales now exceeding offline (or traditional sales channels). Adding online sell-
ing channels provides firms an opportunity to expand the market and achieve a
finer consumer segmentation (Zettelmeyer 2000, Geysken et al. 2002). We use an
online choice experiment to assess the impacts of price and service quality upon
customer purchase behavior across multiple online distribution channels, using
hotel booking as an illustration. The online distribution channels include a reg-
ular full information channel like Expedia, Travelocity and Orbitz; an opaque
posted price channel like Hotwire or Lastminute; and an opaque biding chan-
nel like Priceline’s name-your-own-price (NYOP). Hotwire and Priceline, unlike
the regular full information channel, offer customers opaque products with as-
pects of the service provider concealed until the transaction has been completed.
For instance a customer booking a hotel room through Hotwire does not know
the identity or exact location of their non-refundable choice property until after
their purchase. Similar to the opaque posted price model of Hotwire, Price-
line offers opaque services but without posted prices. On Priceline’s NYOP,
consumers post bids for the opaque service and have to wait for the service
provider to accept or reject their offer. Opaque selling has become popular in
service selling as it allows firms to sell their full priced products to regular brand
loyal customers while simultaneously selling opaquely to non loyal customers
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at discounted prices. We use a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model to assess the
impacts of a hotel’s attributes (such as price, star rating, guest rating and so
on) along with consumer’s own characteristics (loyalty to certain hotel brand,
income level, business and leisure travel frequencies etc.) upon purchase be-
havior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 5.2 we briefly sum-
marize the related literature and motivate the study. Section 5.3 outlines the
questionnaire and focuses on the experimental design. Section 5.4 describes the
experimental data collected and summarizes model results. We conclude in sec-
tion 5.5.
5.2. Literature Review
Our online experiment is motivated by the adoption of opaque intermediaries
for the sale of services. Opaque selling mechanisms have recently received in-
creasing attention in the academic literature. Anderson (2009) provides a de-
tailed description of Priceline’s NYOP model and illustrates methods for deter-
mining optimal bid policies on Priceline. Anderson and Xie (2012) use a nested
logit model in combination with logistic regression and dynamic programming
to illustrate how a service firm can optimally set opaque prices for a hotel using
Hotwire.com. Anderson and Xie (2010) develop a stylized model of a monop-
olist simultaneously selling a product via the three selling channels, a full in-
formation channel, a posted price opaque channel and an opaque channel with
bidding. Anderson and Xie (2010) show how opaque channels naturally seg-
ment customers as a function of their product valuations. This experiment is a
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natural extension of this prior research and empirically studies how consumers
would trade off the desire of obtaining full or more information about a product
with the higher prices associated with that information as well as the incremen-
tal revenue generated for the supplier by adding opaque listings to a regular
full information listing.
5.2.1 Opaque Selling
Using opaque selling in addition to regular selling naturally segments cus-
tomers as it allows firms to sell their differentiated products at higher prices
to regular brand loyal customers while simultaneously selling opaque products
to non loyal customers at discounted prices. Opaque selling enables firms to
facilitate price discrimination and expand the market. These advantages has
also popularized online opaque channels and stimulated the growing interest
on opaque selling in the academic literature.
Most of the early research has been focused on models similar to Price-
line’s NYOP bidding mechanism (Hann and Terwiesch 2003; Fay 2004; Spann
et al. 2004). Recently, research has looked at using opaque channels in a multi-
channel selling environment. Fay (2008) uses a traditional Hotelling model to
study a game between two service providers selling products to two types of
customers (loyals and searchers) on both an opaque posted price channel and
a traditional distribution channel. Fay shows that opaque selling benefits the
monopoly service providerwhen customers have heterogenous values for prod-
ucts. Similar to Fay (2008), Jiang (2007) also develops a Hotelling type model to
illustrate how a firm should price on regular full information channels versus
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opaque channels. Jiang compares opaque selling and regular selling (selling
full-information products), providing insight on when to implement opaque
selling. Jerath et al. (2010) compare opaque selling with last-minute direct sell-
ing and obtain the conditions under which opaque selling is preferred. Wang
et al.(2009) develop a two period game theoretic model of a supplier using
both regular posted price full information channels as well as a NYOP chan-
nel to reach heterogeneous customers. Fay (2009) examines a game between
two firms, and each one can sell either through the NYOP mechanism or the
posted price channel like Hotwire. In his model, customers have different fric-
tional costs on biding on a NYOP retailer but have the same reservation value
for products. Cai et al. (2009) investigates the potential benefits to a NYOP
retailer by adding a retailer-own list-price channel. They compare two biding
scenarios, single-bid and double-bid, in both single-channel and dual-channel
situations.
Priceline’s NYOP mechanism is commonly viewed as a reverse auction
(Ding et al. 2005; Fay and Laran 2009; Fay 2009). While there is an extensive
body of research on the use of auctions very little has focussed on the simul-
taneous use of auctions and posted price selling, with exceptions including
Etizon, Pinker and Seidmann (2006); Van Ryzin and Vulcano (2004 ); Huang
and Sosic (2011) and Caldentey and Vulcano (2007) and Huh and Janakiraman
(2008). Firms can use auctions to reach customers whom may not otherwise
purchase, as posted prices may be too high. Conversely auctions potentially di-
lute revenue as customers willing to pay posted (full prices) may purchase (at
lower prices) via the auction. The opaque nature of Priceline’s NYOP model
helps to avoid this dilution.
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Anderson and Xie (2010) is the only paper that investigates a firm using two
opaque (posted and bidding) channels simultaneously with regular full infor-
mation posted price channels. Instead of assuming two or more exogenous cus-
tomer segments (i.e. business and leisure) with the opaque channels targeted
at the leisure or price sensitive segment) Anderson and Xie develop endoge-
nous consumer segments where consumers strategically choose channel(s) by
maximizing their surplus.
There are some other closely related research which consider various forms
of product differentiation and price discrimination. Fay and Xie (2008) define a
new form of product termed as probabilistic goods under which customers have
a probability of getting any one of several distinct goods. Customers do not
know the identity of the good until after the purchase, which is analogous to
opaque selling. By introducing probabilistic goods, firms are able to reduce
the mismatch between capacity and demand under the circumstance of uncer-
tain customer preferences structure. Another similar concept flexible products
was introduced by Gallego and Phillips (2004) and Gallego et al. (2004). By
selling a flexible product, firms have the flexibility of assigning one out of a set
of alternative products to the customer if there are excess inventories for that
product. Like probabilistic goods, flexibility products are also offered at a dis-
count, which provides a new dimension for firms to segment a market as well
as improve capacity utilization.
An opaque product is also somewhat comparable to damaged goods in De-
neckere andMcAfee (1996) as products available on opaque channels lack some
critical information before the transaction is finished. Deneckere and McAfee
(1996) show that firms could have a Pareto improvement in profits through sell-
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ing intentionally damaged goods along with high-quality goods to heteroge-
nous consumers. They model a monopolist firm segmenting the market in two
cases by offering damaged goods.
In this study, we aim to investigate the impact of product factors (includ-
ing the hotel’s attributes like price, star rating, previous guest rating, winning
chance of biding as well as the consumer’s own characteristics like household
gross income, travel frequency and loyalty to a specific hotel chain) upon the
purchase decision and as such deploy experimental discrete choice models. To
our knowledge, our paper is the first empirical study to understand opaque sell-
ing along with regular selling through experimental choice analysis. We also at-
tempt to empirically show that despite potential cannibalization of regular full
information sales by opaque offerings, total expected revenue increases as the
supplier attracts a larger market of price sensitive customers.
5.2.2 Experimental Choice Analysis
In the past four decades, conjoint analysis has become the most widely ap-
plied method for measuring and analyzing consumer behavior and prefer-
ences. Green and Srinivasan presented a review of conjoint analysis in 1978
(Green and Srinivasan 1978) and updated it with new developments and re-
lated methods in 1990 (Green and Srinivasan 1990). Integrating and applying
theory and methods from probabilistic discrete choice theory and the design
of discrete multivariate statistical experiments; experimental choice analysis is
a relatively recent type of conjoint analysis and has received considerable of
attention from researchers in various areas. Louviere (1992) offers a review
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on the state of art in experimental choice analysis. Verma et al. (1999) refers
this as the choice experiments-based probabilistic discrete choice analysis (DCA).
They provide guidelines for designing and conducting DCA studies for ser-
vices as well as the steps for DCA applications based on choice experiments,
which are illustrated by using an actual application in the pizza delivery Indus-
try. Iqbal et al. (2003) implements experimental choice analysis to understand
consumer choices and preferences in Transaction-based e-services. Pullman
and Thompson (2003) develop an model by combining an experimental choice
analysis-based optimal product designmodel frommarketingwith a simulation
model investigating capacity and demand management strategies from opera-
tions management. They apply this model to determine the profit-maximizing
capacity management strategy for a service network and test it using the data
from an actual ski resort service.
In a typical choice experiment, respondents are asked to choose their prefer-
ences among a set of alternatives with different combinations of levels of multi-
ple attributes in a hypothetical but realistic choice scenario. Louviere andWood-
worth (1983) is one of the first papers that proposed the concept of experimental
choice analysis and illustrate a variety of empirical examples that implemented
the MNL model as the modeling approach. McFadden (1986) provides a com-
prehensive overview on uses of economic choice theory and choice models, es-
pecially MNL, in the analysis of experimental market research data. As in many
experimental choice analysis related research (Iqbal et al. 2003; Louviere and
Woodworth 1983; Elrod et al. 1992; Verma et al. 1999; Verma et al. 2001; Swait
and Andrews 2003; Shankar et al. 2008), we implement the MNL model to an-
alyze the experimental data and measure the impacts of alternatives’ attributes
on consumer preferences. In our study, we design the choice experiment and
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estimate the resulting MNL model to understand consumer preferences among
different types of online channel listings as well as investigate the potential rev-
enue gain by adding opaque listings to the regular full information listing.
5.3. Online Choice Experiment
The online choice experiment is designed to evaluate characteristics of a hotel
and the sales channel that impact purchase behavior. Respondents are asked to
select amongst product offerings in addition to a no-purchase option. Each re-
spondent, in addition to the no purchase option sees three listings: a regular full
information listing similar to what one would see at an online travel agent or
suppliers website, a posted price opaque travel site and an opaque biding travel
site (subsequently referred to as REG, OPQ and BID respectively). Prior to see-
ing the choice scenarios respondents are asked to read educational information
about the three forms of online selling.
5.3.1 Attributes
Respondents are shown ten choice scenarios with each scenario having four al-
ternatives. The first three alternatives include hotels from three different online
distribution channels (REG, OPQ, and BID) with the fourth the no-purchase op-
tion. We set the hotel attributes as realistic as possible in order to imitate the
actual hotel booking experience. A sample choice scenario is shown in Figure
5.1. In an effort to communicate the characteristics of the channels we label the
choices Full Information, Partial Information and Partial Information with Biding
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(REG, OPQ, and BID respectively).
The REG listing has three attributes: chain scale or star rating, price and
traveler review score. The star rating of the hotel has three levels: 3, 312 and
4 star. Prices have four levels: 0.86, 0.93, 1.15 and 1.3 times the average price
for a city-star pair. Table 5.1 summaries average prices for the city-star pairs.
Guest ratings or review scores have four levels : 3.5, 4, 4.5 and 4.8 points on a 5
point scale. The OPQ listings also have the same three attributes as REG. OPQ
listings also have 412 star hotels in addition to 3, 3
1
2 and 4 star. OPQ prices have
four levels (85%, 75%, 65% and 55%) with each levels a % of the corresponding
city-star average price(Table 5.1). OPQ listings also have a no review score review
score level in addition to the 3.5, 4, 4.5 and 4.8 levels used on REG listings.
Similarly BID alternative is characterized by three attributes. The star rating of
BID listings is the same as OPQ (3, 312 , 4 and 4
1
2 ). Similar to OPQ, BID prices are
discounted average city-star pairs with levels 55%, 45% and 35% of the city-star
averages. The third BID attribute is the probability that your bid is accepted,
this attribute has two levels 50% (i.e. a good chance) and 95% or great chance.
Consistent with Priceline’s opaque bidding channel no review scores are shown
for BID listings. The attributes (and levels) are summarized in Table 5.2.
5.4. Data Description and Analysis
In this section, we provide some descriptives of the experimental data which
help us understand some basic consumer purchase behavior among the full in-
formation channel and opaque channels before the full investigation using the
choice modeling approach in the next section. We collected 5310 choice-set re-
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Table 5.1: Average prices per room/night
3 star 3 12 star 4 star 4
1
2 star
Los Angeles $135 $161 $245 $321
Chicago $142 $209 $280 $335
Atlanta $118 $146 $205 $253
New York City $192 $284 $349 $451
Washington DC $254 $297 $359 $470
Seattle $139 $151 $186 $193
Austin $131 $160 $218 $288
Denver $121 $159 $215 $199
Baltimore $148 $174 $250 $340
Charlotte $105 $125 $168 $190
Table 5.2: Attributes & their levels
Alternative Attribute Levels
Full Information Star rating 3; 3 12 ; 4
Price multiplier 0.86, 0.93, 1.15, 1.3
Guest rating 3.5, 4, 4.5, 4.8
Partial Information Star rating 3; 3 12 ; 4; 4
1
2
Prices 55%, 65%, 75%, 85%
Guest rating shown, not shown
Guest rating if shown 3.5, 4, 4.5, 4.8
Partial Information with Biding Star rating 3; 3 12 ; 4; 4
1
2
Prices 35%, 45%, 55%
Chance of winning 95%, 50%
sponses from a sample of 531 respondents. Table 5.3 summarizes the demo-
graphic characteristics of the sample.
As shown in Table 5.4, 30:72% choices are the BID listings as opposed to
130
Table 5.3: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample
Population %
Gender
Female 52.17
Male 47.83
Age (years)
< 17 0.36
18   24 11.41
25   29 9.24
30   34 8.70
35   44 15.76
45   54 26.81
55   64 24.64
65+ 3.08
Household size (persons)
1 21.01
2 37.32
3 18.12
4 14.67
5 5.98
6+ 2.90
Marital status
Married or living with a partner 57.79
Single 41.67
Rather not say 0.54
Gross household income (dollars)
< 25; 000 24.28
25; 000   34; 999 15.76
35; 000   49; 999 17.75
50; 000   74; 999 19.93
75; 000   99; 999 10.70
100; 000   124; 999 5.80
125; 000   149; 999 2.53
150; 000+ 3.26
Education
Some high school 3.08
High school / GED 20.47
Vocational / Technical 4.17
Some college 25.72
2-year college degree 11.59
4-year college degree 22.28
Master’s degree 10.69
Doctoral degree 0.91
Professional degree (J.D., M.D.) 0.91
Other 0.18
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15:16% REG listings, 25:57% OPQ hotel listings and 28:55% indicating they
would not purchase from the options shown.
Table 5.4: Market share (%) by alternative
Alternative REG OPQ BID NONE
Percentage
of choices % 15.16 25.57 30.72 28.55
Table ?? displays the market share (or choice percentages) in percentages by
price and star combinations for each alternative. As you can see from the total
market share in terms of only star rating or only price that 3 stars and lower
prices are more popular options. This implies price plays a very important role
in consumers choice behavior as lower stars are usually associated with lower
prices. However, if you fix either the star rating or the price level and vary
the other, the market share is not necessarily strictly decreasing in that attribute,
whichmeans consumers need to consider some other factors while making their
choices. Thus, motivating our use of choice modeling to understand and quan-
tify attribute impacts.
5.4.1 Customer Choice Modeling
Discrete choice models have been employed to study consumer choice behav-
ior and understand consumer’s brand preferences, market structure as well as
product attributes. Coretjens and Gautschi (1983) provides a general survey of
discrete choice models in marketing and a systematic introduction to discrete
choice modeling theory. During the past 40 years, the multinomial logit (MNL)
model has been the most popular discrete choice model used by marketing re-
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Table 5.5: Market share (%) by star and price combination
Star rating Price related attributes
Price multiplier
REG hotel listing 0.86 0.93 1.15 1.3 Total by star rating
3 2.37 2.18 1.13 1.22 7.00
3.5 2.02 1.47 0.92 0.60 5.01
4 1.02 0.89 0.70 0.64 3.24
Total by price multiplier 5.40 4.54 2.75 2.47
Price
OPQ hotel listing 55% 65% 75% 85% Total by star rating
3 2.98 2.37 2.05 1.98 9.38
3.5 2.47 2.09 1.60 1.19 7.34
4 2.18 1.30 2.05 0.94 5.33
4.5 1.02 0.87 0.00 0.49 3.52
Total by price discount 8.64 6.63 5.71 4.60
Price
BID hotel listing 35% 45% 55% Total by star rating
3 4.60 2.81 1.86 9.27
3.5 3.39 2.90 2.52 8.81
4 3.48 2.34 1.66 7.48
4.5 2.32 1.60 1.24 5.16
Total by price discount 13.79 9.64 7.29
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searchers (e.g. Guadagni and Little 1983, Krishnamurthi and Raj 1991, Go¨nu¨l
and Srinivasan 1993, Fader and Hardie 1996).
In a discrete choice model, an individual decision maker (consumer) makes
a choice among a feasible set of alternatives. The decision is often made by
maximizing random utilities of the alternatives. The MNL model is the most
commonly used random utility model. For a greater detail in discrete choice
modeling or the MNL model, please refer to McFadden (1981) or Ben-Akiva
and Lerman (1985).
In an MNL model, we usually consider a universal set of alternatives de-
noted by C. The set of alternatives for consumer n is denoted by Cn  C. Uni
denotes the random utility of alternative i for consumer n, which can be divided
into two addictive components: Uni = Vni + "ni, where, Vni is the deterministic
(representative )component. "ni is the random component and "ni s are indepen-
dent and identically Gumbel distributed.
Each alternative i in a choice set Cn is often characterized by a finite set of
observable attributes xni1; xni2; :::; xnik in the following way:
Vni = 0xni (5.1)
where xni = (xni1; xni2; :::; xnik)0 and i = (i1; i2; :::; ik)0 is the vector of unknown
parameters that need to be estimated.
Every consumer is a utility maximizer, so the choice probability of alterna-
134
tive i 2 Cn is given by
Pn(i) = Pr[Uni  Un j; all j 2 Cn f or 8n]
=
eVniP
j2Cn e
Vn j
=
e
0
ixniP
j2Cn e
0xn j
(5.2)
We estimate the parameters i and obtain the choice probabilities by apply-
ing maximum likelihood method.
In our MNL, the respondent makes a choice among the four alternatives in
the choice set C = fREG, OPQ, BID, No Purchaseg. The utility associated with
the first three alternatives for respondent n is given by
Uni = 0ixni + "ni (5.3)
Where, i = 1; 2; 3 represents the alternatives REG, OPQ and BID respectively;
xni are the vectors including attributes for alternative i and the characteristics of
consumer n;
i are the corresponding vectors of parameters to be estimated using the MNL
model.
By (5.2), the probability Pn(i) respondent n chooses alternative i is given as
the follows:
Pn(i) =
e
0
ixniP j=3
j=1 e
0jxn j + eU00
(5.4)
where, i = 1; 2; 3 represents the alternatives REG, OPQ and BID respectively.
U00 represents the utility of ”No Purchase” choice. The ”No Purchase” choice
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probability is
P00 =
eU00P j=3
j=1 e
0jxn j + eU00
: (5.5)
Note that using an MNL model requires alternatives in the choice set to
have the independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property which holds
that changes in the choice set do not affect the ratio of choice probabilities of
any two alternatives. As one can see that in equation (5.2),
P
i2Cn Pn(i) = 1, the
IIA property implies if some alternatives are removed or added from the choice
set Cn, the choice probabilities Pn(i) will be proportionally revised so that they
can still be summed up to be 1 (Ratliff et al. 2008). Specifically, in our situation,
when we add either the OPQ hotel listing or the BID hotel listing (or both) to the
REG hotel listing, we can compute the proportionally shifted new choice prob-
abilities of each alternative and so the potential incremental expected revenue.
We discuss this in detail later on as we investigate the incremental revenue to
firm from utilizing opaque listings in addition to regular full information list-
ings.
As one can see in (5.4) and (5.5), we are facing an issue of properly esti-
mating the utility of the ”No Purchase” choice (U00). We assume that there are
enough hotels in the market such that ”No Purchase” consumers actually pur-
chase from other hotels (competitors). Under this assumption, analogous to
Ratliff et al. (2008) which provides a recapture heuristic for estimating uncon-
strained demand from airline bookings, we use the average market share from
aggregate data from Smith Travel Research (www.str.com) to proximate the ”No
Purchase” utility. Specifically we assume that we know or can estimate a hotel’s
market share (the total of the three listings on the three channels) denoted by
MS h, then the competitors’ market share is MS c = 1 MS h and this is the simpli-
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fied estimate of the likelihood of the ”No Purchase” choice P00. Therefore sub-
stituting into equations (5.4) and (5.5) provides an estimate for ”No Purchase”
utility U00 which can be solved from the equation below
eU00 =
MS c
MS h
j=3X
j=1
e
0
jxn j
=
1   MS h
MS h
j=3X
j=1
e
0
jxn j : (5.6)
A similar estimationmethodwas also implementedMeterelliyoz et al. (2009)
and Ferguson et al. (2009).
Substituting (5.6) and MS c = 1 MS h into (5.4), we have the choice probabil-
ities for all three alternatives i = 1; 2; 3 (REG, OPQ, BID respectively):
Pn(i) = MS h
e
0
ixniP j=3
j=1 e
i j0xn j
(5.7)
5.4.2 Model Estimation Results and Analysis
In this section, we provide our MNL model estimation results in Table 5.6 and
discuss how hotel attributes and consumer characteristics influence the choice
behavior.
In Table 5.6, Business frequent, Leisure frequent, Loyal to hotel and Income are
the four characteristics of respondents which have statistically significant im-
pacts on their choice preference. Respondents were asked how often (weekly,
monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, annually, less than once a year and never)
they stay in hotels while traveling for business and leisure purposes respec-
tively. We define frequent travelers (coded as 1) as those traveling either weekly
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Table 5.6: MNL parameter estimation results
Variable Name Parameter Standard P-value
Estimate Error
Business frequent (REG) 1.8180 0.3101 0.0000
Business frequent (OPQ) 1.7182 0.2976 0.0000
Business frequent (BID) 0.6609 0.3181 0.0377
Leisure frequent (REG) 0.4656 0.2367 0.0491
Leisure frequent (OPQ) 1.0532 0.2085 0.0000
Leisure frequent (BID) 0.7824 0.2122 0.0002
Loyal to hotel (REG) 0.6251 0.1757 0.0004
Income (REG) 0.1692 0.0243 0.0000
Income (OPQ) 0.0594 0.0216 0.0059
Income (BID) 0.0504 0.0207 0.0149
REG constant 0.9635 0.4157 0.0205
OPQ constant 1.9570 0.1423 0.0000
BID constant 1.4886 0.2366 0.0000
REG price -2.2751 0.2387 0.0000
OPQ price -2.9436 0.2955 0.0000
BID price -3.1986 0.3833 0.0000
BID chance of winning 0.5159 0.0624 0.0000
REG guest rating 0.0892 0.0798 0.2636
OPQ guest rating if shown 0.1782 0.0740 0.0160
OPQ guest rating (shown or no shown) -0.5950 0.3232 0.0656
3.5 star -0.2646 0.0504 0.0000
4 star -0.6620 0 .0530 0.0000
4.5 star -1.0840 0.0647 0.0000
or monthly, all others infrequent (0). The coefficient estimates for the Business
frequent variable among the three alternatives implying frequent business trav-
elers prefer REG hotel listing to the other two. On the contrary, the frequent
leisure travelers favor the OPQ alternative. Indicating business travelers have a
preference for known hotel locations (perhaps at the expense of price) whereas
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leisure travelers may forgo the exact location/name in exchange for a discount.
Respondents were asked if they belonged to a hotel chain loyalty program
(and if so which one). These loyalty programmembers were then shown listings
from chains that they were loyal to in addition to hotels from other chains. The
dummy variable Loyal to hotel is coded as 1 if the REG listing is from a hotel
within the respondents loyalty program and 0 otherwise. Its positive coefficient
estimate indicates consumers who are in the loyalty program are more likely
choose a listing from that chain (on the REG channel).
As one would expect, lower prices increase purchase likelihood. We use
channel specific price effects to capture varying price sensitivities across the
three channels, with all three channels having negative coefficients and im-
pacts of price increasing with loss of information (REG<OPQ<BID). Similarly, a
higher chance of winning gives the higher utility to the BID alternative (Chance
of winning variable is coded to be 1 if it is 95% and 0 if it is 50%). We can also use
the channel specific price coefficeints to estimate channel specific price elastici-
ties, using the coefficients to estimate the percent change in purchase probability
(of a channel) as a function of the percent change in price of that channel. The
elasticity estimates are -1.85 for REG, -1.38 for OPQ and -.90 for BID. These elas-
ticities are all negative as anticipated. The are also decreasing with opacity, this
is a function of the already low opaque channel prices and while price does
impact opaque channels a price change on the full information channel is more
likely to impact share of that channel (as it moves opaque or no-purchase guests
to the full information channel).
Guest ratings also have channel specific effects. For OPQ ratings have two
coefficients, an indicator for listed as well as coefficient for the continuous guest
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rating score. So for OPQ the utility impact of this attribute is the combination of
these two effects, e.g. if a guest rating of 3.5 is shown, then the value to the util-
ity is 3:50:1782+( 0:5950) = 0:0287. This value is bigger that zero i.e. the value
of the guest rating not shown. This tells us showing guest rating attracts con-
sumers more than not showing it. Similarly, we can compute the value added
to the utility for guest rating being 4, which is 0.1179, and so the marginal incre-
ment percentage to the utility when guest rating increases from 3.5 to 4 given
other attributes remaining the same is (0:1179  0:0287)=0:0287 = 309:72%. Table
5.7 provides the marginal utility increment percentages for both REG and OPQ
alternatives when guest rating variable increasing one level. As we can see that
the marginal utility increment percentages for the OPQ alternative are bigger
than those for the REG alternative, which implies increasing guest rating has
a bigger impact on consumers favoring the OPQ alternative than favoring the
REG alternative. We believe this is because without knowing the exact identity
of the hotel listing, previous guests’ evaluations of the hotel become more valu-
able to consumers. Another finding is the utility increment percentage from
increasing guest ratings decreases while guest rating gets bigger, and so this
shows once the guest rating is high enough (e.g. 4), increasing guest rating
will not have as big of the impact on consumers choice as before.
Table 5.7: The marginal utility increment percentages with increasing
guest rating
Increasing guest rating Marginal utility increment percentage%
OPQ REG
3.5 to 4 309.72 14.29
4 to 4.5 75.59 12.50
4.5 to 4.8 25.83 6.67
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From the estimates of the star coefficients we conclude that 3 stars are the
most popular, which is consistent with the market share statistic shown in Table
5.5.
Table 5.8: Nested logit model fit diagnostics
LL -6705.311
LL -7195.937
Chi-squared[20] 981.253
Prob [chi squared>critical value] 0.000
Table 5.8 summarizes model fit characteristics. The LL value is the log-
likelihood of the estimated model and LL is the log-likelihood for a reference
model which has alternative specific constants only, i.e. the market shares pre-
dicted by the model are what are in the data. To determine whether the esti-
mated model is superior to its reference model, the  2(LL   LL) value obtained
is compared to a Chi-square statistic with degrees of freedom (20 in our model)
equal to the difference in the number of parameters estimated for the two mod-
els (Hensher et al. 2005). As seen in Table 5.8 that the p   value (i.e. Prob [chi
squared>critical value]) is 0:000, which is less than the level of  = 0:05, and
so we reject the null hypothesis that the estimated model is no better than the
reference model.
5.4.3 Incremental revenue from opaque booking channels
This section illustrates the determination of incremental revenue for a service
provider from adding opaque listings to their traditional full information list-
ings. Assume a hotel has the flexibility to list rooms on any of the three chan-
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nels: regular full information channel, opaque partial information channel and
opaque partial information with biding channel. The REG and OPQ listings are
priced at p1 and p2 respectively, and the BID hotel listing is given a price p3
along with a certain winning probability to mock the biding process.
The hotel lists rooms on all three channels and receives a market share MS h.
The hotel only receives a fraction (denoted by d) of the demand for the opaque
listings presented by the choice probability from the MNL model as given their
opaque nature some of these transactions are at competing (same star, same sim-
ilar location) hotels. Therefore, given the attributes of the three hotel listings,
characteristics of the customer n, and fraction of the demand for the opaque list-
ings d, the total expected revenue the hotel can obtain from these three listings
is given by:
1 = p1Pn1 +
j=3X
j=2
dp jPn j (5.8)
Where, Pn j; j = 1; 2; 3 are given in (5.7). If the hotel decides to only list a room
on the regular full information channel, then by the IIA property mentioned
previously, the choice probability Pn1 for the REG alternative needs to be pro-
portionally adjusted so that the sum of it and the choice probability of the No
Purchase alternative is still one. Thus, we have
Pn1 =
e
0
1xn1
e01xn1 + eU00
; (5.9)
where U00 is given in (5.6). So the corresponding total expected revenue that the
hotel can now obtain is
2 = p1Pn1; (5.10)
where Pn1 is given by (5.9).
If the hotel adds an OPQ listing to the REG listing, then similarly, the IIA prop-
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erty implies the new choice probabilities Pn1 and Pn2 given by the following
Pni =
e
0
ixniP j=2
j=1 e
0jxn j + eU00
; i = 1; 2 (5.11)
where U00 is given in (5.6). Therefore, the total expected revenue that the hotel
can now have is
3 = p1Pn1 + dp2Pn2; (5.12)
where Pn1 and Pn2 are given by (5.11).
Similar to the above, but instead of the OPQ listing, the hotel adds the BID
listing to the REG listing, then the total expected revenue that the hotel can get
is
4 = p1Pn1 + dp3Pn3; (5.13)
where
Pni =
e
0
ixni
e01xn1 + e
0
3xn3 + eU00
; i = 1; 3
and U00 is given in (5.6).
Hence, adding an OPQ listing to a REG listing gives a potential revenue
increment percentage of (3   2)=2; adding a BID listing to a REG listing gives
a potential revenue increment percentage of (4 2)=2; and adding both opaque
listings to a REG listing provides a potential revenue increment percentage of
(1   2)=2. Next, we use the following examples to illustrate how to compute
these potential incremental revenues.
Example 1 Consider a 3 star Hilton hotel priced at $177 (the price multiplier
is 1.15), located in Time Square, New York City, with guest rating 4.5, displayed
on the regular full information channel. The respondent n, a member of the loy-
alty program of Hilton (i.e.HHONORS), is a frequent traveler for both business
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and leisure purposes and with a household gross income of less than $100; 000.
The service provider lists the hotel room on the opaque posted price channel
at a price of $100 per room/night (65% of average). The service provider can
also list the hotel room on the opaque biding channel with a 50 % chance that a
bid 55% of average is accepted. We estimate the hotel’s market share (required
to estimate no-purchase utility) using data reported by Smith Travel Research
(STR). STR reports average 2010 market share (by channel) as follows: online
travel agents 4:6%, supplier website (e.g. Hilton.com) 17:5% and opaque online
travel agent at 2% with other channels comprising the remaining 75.9%. We
can approximate the hotel’s demand on regular full information channel to be
the sum of the online travel agent and the supplier’s own website (23.1%) with
opaque travel sites at 2%. Hence, the hotel’s market share is approximately
MS h = 4:6% + 17:5% + 2% = 24:1%. With seven 3 star hotels in Time Square
area, we approximate the fraction (d) of the demand that the opaque listings of
this hotel gets is 1=7. Therefore, knowing the attributes of these three hotel list-
ings, the consumer’s own characteristics and the fraction parameter, along with
the MNL model estimation results, we use the equations (5.8), (5.10), (5.12) and
(5.13) to calculate the potential revenue increment percentages as shown in Ta-
ble 5.9. In Example 2 we raise the opaque price to $115 per room/night, and in
Example 3, the prices on the REG, OPQ and BID channels are changed to $143
per room/night (the price multiplier is 0.93), $115 per room/night (75%), and
$54 per room/night (35%) with a 95% chance of being accepted.
Table 5.9 is the revenue increment for a specific example, and Table 5.10 dis-
plays the average incremental revenues from adding an OPQ listing to a REG
listing (averaged across all possible attribute levels). Similarly, Table 5.11 shows
these same average incremental revenues from adding an opaque bidding chan-
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Table 5.9: Revenue Increment from adding opaque listings (%) for specific
examples
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3
Adding an OPQ listing to a REG listing 6.29 4.91 4.91
Adding a BID listing to a REG listing 1.15 1.17 3.39
Adding both OPQ and BID listings to a REG listing 6.53 4.64 2.26
nel. Table 5.12 shows the highest and lowest average revenue increment per-
centages from adding both opaque listings to a REG listing for each REG price.
Examples 1-3 as well as Tables 5.10-5.12 show the potential revenue gains
provided by the natural customer segmentation provided by adding opaque
listings to full information listings. However, appropriate prices need to be
set on these three channels in order to balance the revenue gain from having
extra opaque demand and the revenue loss from diluting the revenue that we
could have received from selling a full priced product through the regular chan-
nel. As seen in Example 1 (Table 5.9) the balance between the revenue gain and
loss is well achieved as adding two opaque listings has the largest incremental
revenue, whereas in Example 2 adding two opaque listings is worse than just
one opaque listing. This revenue loss in Example 2 is attributed to the higher
opaque posted prices (than Example 1) now with some OPQ customers becom-
ing opaque bidders (at lower bids versus the opaque posted price).
If full information prices and opaque prices are not sufficiently separated
then opaque selling fails to separate customers (into appropriate segments) and
is unable to generate substantive revenue gains. With low full information
prices very little gain is possible by adding opaque, with the potential for rev-
enue dilution. Maximal customer segmentation is achieved as full information
prices increase and opaque prices decrease. However, one might notice that
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incremental revenues decrease with increasing OPQ prices but increase with in-
creasing opaque bidding prices. This is a result of BID prices being lower than
the OPQ prices. In fact, by adding the OPQ listing, the prices are high enough
such that the negative impact to the revenue by lowering prices can be offset by
the increased choice probabilities. Thus, the lower the price the bigger the price
difference to the REG price which creates a better chance to attract more cus-
tomers without diluting the REG channel demand. On the contrary, adding the
BID listing with low prices, the extra demand can not compensate for revenue
losses (from decreased REG market share).
As shown in Table 5.12, the service provider obtains the largest incremen-
tal revenue in the presence of all three channels, as if prices are set appropri-
ately a finer degree of customer segmentation is possible (versus single or dual
channels).Thus, implementing more opaque channels in addition to the regular
channel and with an appropriate price structure will generate greater revenue
than just using one opaque channel to a regular full information channel (not
even mention just operating the full information channel alone).
Table 5.10: Average incremental revenue from adding an OPQ listing to a
REG listing (%)
OPQ price REG price multiplier
0.86 0.93 1.15 1.3
0.55 7.34 8.48 14.28 20.63
0.65 6.81 7.75 12.70 18.22
0.75 6.10 6.86 10.97 15.65
0.85 5.38 5.98 9.32 13.21
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Table 5.11: Average incremental revenue from adding a BID listing to a
REG listing (%)
BID price REG price multiplier
0.86 0.93 1.15 1.3
0.35 -0.87 -0.67 0.75 2.55
0.45 0.24 0.45 1.85 3.58
0.55 0.88 1.08 2.37 3.94
Table 5.12: Incremental revenue from adding both OPQ and BID listings
to a REG listing (%)
REG price multiplier
0.86 0.93 1.15 1.3
Highest value 8.07 9.49 16.56 24.39
Lowest value 3.63 4.32 8.52 12.99
5.5. Summary and Managerial Insights
Selling through opaque posted channels (e.g. Hotwire.com) or/and opaque bid-
ing channels (e.g. Priceline.com) along with regular full information channels
(e.g. Expedia.com, Hilton.com) provides the service provider an opportunity to
segment consumers, expand the market, and increase the total revenue. On the
one hand, consumers who are less sensitive to prices and loyal to a brand (or
simply prefer to know the hotel name/location) will choose to book the room
through the regular full information channel. On the other hand, price sensi-
tive consumers who are brand agnostic will exchange information for price and
book through opaque channels. Therefore, adding opaque channels to an exist-
ing regular full information channel enables the service provider capture more
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consumers without diluting the revenue (assuming prices are set efficiently).
Through our stated preference choice experimental procedure we have been
able to empirically validate these potential revenue gains.
We use an MNL choice model to study the consumers purchase preferences
among these three channels and find that the regular full information channel is
more attractive to those less price sensitive frequent business travelers. In con-
trast, the leisure frequent travelers favor the hotel listed on the opaque channels
than the listings on the regular channel. As we expect that consumers with
lower income tend to be more price sensitive and value listings on the opaque
channels. Consumers who are members of loyalty programs tend to exhibit
brand preferences resulting in an increase in the utility of the full information
channel. As expected favorable guest review scores will increase the likelihood
of being chosen with a higher marginal impact on opaque listings versus full
information listings.
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Figure 5.1: Sample choice scenario
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY
As a new revenue management technique, opaque selling has become pop-
ular in service selling as it allows firms to sell their differentiated product at
higher prices to regular brand loyal customers while simultaneously selling to
non-brand loyal customers at discounted prices.
The first two chapters in the dissertation provide an overview on opaque
selling mechanism and its related academic literature. In Chapter 3, a nested
logit model is estimated on a data from firms selling hotel rooms at Hotwire.com
to understand the customers’ choice preferences on hotels located in Washing-
ton D.C. This research is the first choice based revenue management model that
uses market level demand data (versus a single firm’s sales data) to estimate
the underlying demand models. Demand is modeled as a function of a prop-
erty’s prices using the result from the nested logit model and a choice-based
dynamic programming model is developed with pricing as the decision vari-
able. Two stochastic dynamic programming formulations is proposed, one with
daily fixed prices and one with fully dynamic prices. We provide a complete
characterization of optimal dynamic prices and a partial characterization for
optimal daily fixed prices. We show numerically that optimal fixed prices are
consistent with the properties of dynamic prices. We then use these two char-
acterizations to estimate revenue impacts from daily fixed versus fully dynamic
pricing policies. Although it might be easier for firms to implement daily fixed
pricing policy, dynamic pricing offers better revenue increment opportunities.
This formulation can be extended to the situation where the firm simultane-
ously release inventory across numerous channels - both opaque like Hotwire
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(e.g. Priceline’s Name-Your-Own-Price) and fully transparent (e.g. Expedia or
Marriott.com). Thus, an interesting direction for future research is to consider
consumer choice behavior both across service providers as well as channel se-
lection.
In Chapter 4, we have developed a stylized model of when and how to de-
ploy an opaque selling strategy in concert with regular full information pricing.
Unlike previous research which usually assumes an exogenous consumer sepa-
ration into regular consumers and opaque consumers we endogenously model
this channel selection process as a function of prices and channel characteristics
(opacity). We have shown that even in the face of capacity constraints firms
should be simultaneously using opaque channels in concert with regular chan-
nels whereas historically focus has been on using opaque channels to sell dis-
tressed or otherwise unsellable inventory (surplus capacity). The simultaneous
use of opaque selling with regular full information selling effectively segments
consumers - allowing firms to sell at higher prices to higher valuation/brand
loyal consumers and at lower prices to lower valuation/brand agnostic shop-
pers via opaque channels and increase firm revenues. Instead of considering
a single service provider, a potential model extension could be incorporating
competition among service providers in a game setting while each has the op-
portunity to sell through all three types of distribution channels.
As a natural extension of the research in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 empirically
studies how consumers would trade off the desire of obtaining full or more
information about a product with the higher prices associated with that infor-
mation as well as the incremental revenue generated for the supplier by adding
opaque listings to a regular full information listing. Through our stated prefer-
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ence choice experimental procedure we have been able to empirically validate
the potential revenue gains by adding opaque channels to an existing regular
full information channel (assuming prices are set efficiently). We use an MNL
choice model to study the consumers purchase preferences among these three
channels and find that the regular full information channel is more attractive
to those less price sensitive frequent business travelers. In contrast, the leisure
frequent travelers favor the hotel listed on the opaque channels than the listings
on the regular channel. As we expect that consumers with lower income tend to
be more price sensitive and value listings on the opaque channels. Consumers
who are members of loyalty programs tend to exhibit brand preferences result-
ing in an increase in the utility of the full information channel. As expected
favorable guest review scores will increase the likelihood of being chosen with
a higher marginal impact on opaque listings versus full information listings.
This research is limited by the difficulty of simulating the biding procedure of
the opaque biding channels. In order to do a choice experiment, we list the bid
price in stead of consumers submitting their own bids and only provide two
winning probabilities. So in our future research, one direction is to improve our
experiment design and offer more winning probabilities, so that we can imitate
the biding scenarios better. Another direction that might be worth to explore
is to design the experiment so that allows the respondents to bid as in real life,
but still in a way that enables us to do the choice analysis. We hope that this
could be a good addition to both literature of the experimental choice analysis
and empirical study of opaque selling.
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